https://spaceraccoon.github.io/vulnerability-spoiler-alert Vulnerability alerts for apache/airflow en-us Tue, 11 Aug 2026 21:01:38 GMT https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/406 https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/406 Tue, 11 Aug 2026 11:55:40 GMT The Calendar view endpoint computes planned runs for cron-based timetables by iterating croniter until the year boundary with no upper bound, unlike the generic timetable path which caps at MAX_PLANNED_RUNS. Any authenticated user with Dag read access can create/view a Dag with a high-frequency cron schedule (e.g., a seconds-resolution cron) and trigger minutes of CPU consumption per request just by opening the Calendar tab, allowing them to pin/exhaust an API server worker with minimal effort. medium unverified https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/370 https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/370 Wed, 05 Aug 2026 04:33:16 GMT The BaseSerialization.deserialize method used import_string() on an attacker-controlled class name embedded in serialized DAG blobs (AIRFLOW_EXC_SER/BASE_EXC_SER nodes) to reconstruct exception objects. Because import_string will import arbitrary modules and access arbitrary attributes by dotted name, a crafted serialized DAG could cause the deserializer to import and execute code from any importable module (including modules with import-time side effects, or builtins like eval/os.system), leading to code execution or unintended behavior when a malicious/tampered serialized DAG is loaded. The patch restricts resolution to already-loaded classes validated as AirflowException subclasses or a fixed builtin allow-list, preventing import of attacker-named modules/classes. high verified https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/359 https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/359 Tue, 04 Aug 2026 14:14:14 GMT Configuration options registered as sensitive (like database connection strings with passwords) were only masked when queried under their base section name. Team-scoped overrides stored in `\[<team>=<section>\]` config sections or `AIRFLOW__<TEAM>___<SECTION>__<KEY>` environment variables bypassed the sensitivity check entirely, exposing secrets like database credentials in clear text via the config API and `as_dict()` output. medium verified