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    <title>Vulnerability Spoiler Alert - argoproj/argo-cd</title>
    <link>https://spaceraccoon.github.io/vulnerability-spoiler-alert</link>
    <description>Vulnerability alerts for argoproj/argo-cd</description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 14:23:07 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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    <item>
      <title>[MEDIUM] Concurrent Data Access (Race Condition) / Denial of Service in argoproj/argo-cd</title>
      <link>https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/599</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/599</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 16:12:18 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>The notification controller&apos;s getAppProj function retrieved an AppProject object from the shared informer cache and mutated its annotations in place. Since informer cache objects are shared among goroutines, concurrent calls to getAppProj for multiple applications referencing the same project could result in concurrent map writes, causing a fatal runtime error and crashing the notification controller. The patch deep-copies the object before mutation, ensuring the cache is not modified.</description>
      <category>medium</category>
      <category>verified</category>
      
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[HIGH] Information Disclosure / Sensitive Data Exposure (Masking Bypass) in argoproj/argo-cd</title>
      <link>https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/403</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/403</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2026 18:09:53 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>The ServerSideDiff API decided whether to mask Secret data based on the caller-supplied liveResources\[i\].Kind/Group metadata rather than the actual kind of the target/live manifest being diffed. An attacker with get access to an Application could submit a liveResources entry with a spoofed non-Secret Kind (e.g., ConfigMap) paired with a real Secret target manifest at the same index, causing the server to skip masking and return the Secret&apos;s plaintext data (e.g., passwords, tokens) in the diff response.</description>
      <category>high</category>
      <category>verified</category>
      
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[MEDIUM] Sensitive Data Exposure / Information Disclosure in argoproj/argo-cd</title>
      <link>https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/367</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://github.com/spaceraccoon/vulnerability-spoiler-alert/issues/367</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 18:04:29 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>When performing a server-side diff on a Kubernetes Secret, the kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration annotation on the predicted-live (target) resource was not masked, even though the corresponding annotation on the live resource was hidden. Since this annotation can contain the full JSON representation of the applied Secret (including plaintext data values), it could leak secret contents in the diff output (e.g., displayed in Argo CD UI/CLI diffs or logs) even though HideSecretData was meant to redact secret values symmetrically.</description>
      <category>medium</category>
      <category>verified</category>
      
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